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Abstract
The international community witnessed a self-proclaimed'historical
breakthrough'at the World Trade Organization (WTO) in late Summer 2004 as a
framework was created to eliminate all export subsidies and reduce domestic
subsidies and tariffs respectively. While many hailed this step as a major victory for
developing nations, others have been cautious on the 'success'of this agreement.
This honor thesis evaluates the short- and long-term effects of this framework
agreement on the agricultural sectors of the US, South Africa and Mali. The paper
first undertakes a historical nalysis of what led to this 'victory'for developing nations
at the WTO. The paper then focuses on two major crops, cotton and maize, in order
to explore the impact of the agreement on poverty alleviation, food security and
ecological nd economic sustainability. Ultimately, the thesis proposes everal policy
considerations in order to harvest the 'potential' historical breakthrough in the long-
run.
1. lntroduction
ln a July 11th, 2003 editorial in the New York Times, the presidents of Mali
and Burkina Faso, ToumaniToure and Blaise Compaore, gave a compassionate
plea to the US public to end its unfair subsidizing ofcotton. With their title "Your farm
subsidies are strangling us", they argued that $3 billion annualfarm subsidies in
2001-2002 to "relatively well-off armers has the unintended but nevertheless real
effect of impoverishing some 10 million rural poor people in West and Central Africa"
(Toure and Compaore, 2003). They subsequently appealed to the World Trade
Organization (WTO), the world's consensus-based ruling body on free trade, to
"apply free trade rules not only to those products that are of interest to the rich and
powerful, but also to those products [, cotton,]where poor countries have a proven
comparative advantage." (ibid.) Together with Brazil, Benin and lvory Coast, they
filed a complaint to the WTO claiming that an elimination of US export subsidies
would result in increased earnings for African cotton farmers of $250 million annually
(Smith and Rice,2004).
As of early September 2OO4, the WTO has ruled and affirmed their ruling in
its landmark case that US cotton subsidies and expoft credits, along with EU trade-
distorting sugar support, have been found to "contravene WTO rules" of free trade
(Oxtam, 2004). Furthermore, the WTO and its 147 members revitalized talks on the
Doha Development Agendatocusing on all agriculturalsubsidies which were
doomed for failure through "round-the-clock meetings produc[ed a] historic
breakthrough" onAugust 1st 2004 (WTO News, 2OO4l. The result of this "grueling
session", which included major concession of the US and EU, was a ground-
breaking Framework on agriculture and manufactured goods to eliminate all export
subsidies and the limitation of other subsidies, trade-distorting support and tariff
barriers (WTO News, 2004).
In order to understand the story of the 'historic breakthrough', asproclaimed
by WTO Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi, I first examine the various power-
players and other actors that have shaped this particular outcome. This chronological
grounding of the 'historical' breakthrough will be based in an analysis of the power-
struggles that went hand-in-hand with the creation of the GeneralAgreements on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947 and the subsequent birth of the WTO in 1995. This
analysis, while by no means exhaustive, presents a succinct overview of the more
than fifty years of liberalforces that have attempted to increase free trade based on
the widespread wisdoms and lessons learned and applied during the post-Second
World War era.
Secondly, I present and analyze the most important and significant
agricultural negotiations and treaties, especially the Uruguay Agreement on
Agriculture that have emerged during the post- World War llera. lt is within this
context hat I present he July 31't 2oO4'breakthrough', l e Geneva Accord, or
Agricultural Framework Agreement and the recent Cotton Dispute Settlementthat
was achieved at the WTO in order to assess whether or not they constitute historic
breakthroughs.
Third, I provide an in-depth analysis of the agricultural sectors in the United
States, Mali and South Africa, focusing on cotton and maize within each economy.
This Fourth, I analyze the prospects of the WTO Framework agreement and the
Cotton Dispute Settlement for the maize and cotton sectors in the US, Mali and
South Africa. This analysis answers the research question on the potential impact on
food security for these small- and large-scale farmers. Fifth, this analysis of the
2. Methodology
The primary methodology applied in this paper is the case study method,
which investigates three countries on the impact of the WTO Framework agreement.
The three countries, United States, South Africa and Mali, were chosen concerning
their respective situation on the developmental l dder. While the United States is
clearly situated at its top, South Africa has already past the first major steps and Mali
is currently in the process of gaining a strong foothold on the ladder's first steps.
ln terms of research methods, this case study analysis is built upon an in-
depth literature review, which includes extensive analysis of statistical sources and
empirical studies. These analyses of statisticaldata include both the usage of tertiary
data sets, such as Environmental Working Group, as well as the evaluation of
secondary sets, such as the FAO STATS homepage.
Furthermore, the case study analysis is severely limited by financial and time
constraints, as I have been unable to undertake necessary field work within the three
countries myself and am indebted to fellow scholars having undertaken this hard and
insightful work. Last, but not least, as becomes evident when critiquing this work, its
scope is limited by the fast-moving developments and works published and released
in this field of international gricultural policies. Consequently, while certain parts will
be outdated as more information, such as the modalities by the end of 2005 at the
Hong Kong summit, will be released, its findings nevertheless hould create an
accurate account of current agriculturaldevelopmental progress up to this stage
3. From 1lh Century Liberalism to GATT
While the Western hemisphere has been dominated for more than 500 years
by mercantilist capitalism and protectionism, it was as early as in the mid 19th century
that the leading world power, Great Britain, took a major step towards the freeing of
agriculturaltrade. Facing pressure from its industrial bourgeoisie, it repealed the
protectionist Corn Laws in 1846 and opened up their markets in favor of cheaper
imported food and increased market-access for industrial products and textiles. As
Lekachman, biographer of Keynes, commentates, "the nation had finatly settled the
issue of free trade versus protection" and its success inspired in the third-quarter
other European ations to follow suit (1966). lnternational trade increased
dramatically, reaching its highest level during what Polanyi has termed the Hundred
Years' Peace, a balance-of-power system that was based upon a self-regulating
market supported by a stable international gold standard. ltwas during this period
that the idea was founded that "trade had become linked with peace", a doctrine well
established inthe present context of global capitalism and reminiscent ofClintonian
policies (Polanyi, 1944, p.3tf).
With the unraveling of the gold standard and the subsequent breakdown
resulting in World War l, "most leading capitalist countries reverted to mercantilist-
type protectionism" (Peet, 2003, p.147). These sentiments were especially well-
founded in the 1930s during the periods of the Great Depression, inwhich countries
resorted to unilateraltariff increases given the unstable and volatile international
trade environment and the lack of exchange rate stability.
Having reached the ultimate climax of protectionism in the Second World
War, countries were eager to establish multilateral trade organizations that would
reconnect formerly dislocated war-nations. Inaddition to the International Monetary
Fund (lMF) and the World Bank (WB), an InternationalTrade Organization (lTO) was
proposed in order to "oversee the operation of a multilateral code of trade conduct"
(lngco and Nash, 2004, p.25). However, this code of trade conduct was contingent
upon the United Nations' (UN) approvalot multilateraltreaties, which as Peet
proclaims, was "a targe fly in the internationalointment" from a US perspective
(2003, p. 148). As US controlof the UN was limited, the US Congress ubsequently
rejected in 1948 the Charter of the International Trade Organization, fearing its newly
gained hegemonic status would be undermined by a communist trade scheme. As a
matter of fact, the ability for the UN to impose sanctions on the US in case of non-
compliance would have involved "a sacrifice of sovereignty unprecedented inthe
history of [the US]" (Loree qtd. in Peet, 2003, p.149).
It is within this context hat the 23 post-World War ll countriesr involved in the
negotiations consequently resorted back to the earlier agreed on General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in October 1947 in Geneva. While lacking the
institutional capacity and a strong enforcement mechanism of the lTO, its main
features, "limited mandate, qualified legal obligations, rudimentary dispute settlement
mechanism, improvised institutional rrangement inGeneva, and unsatisfactory
arrangements for agricultural trade", became the foundation of more than forty years
of trade liberalization (l gco and Nash, 2004, p.25l.As Jagdish Bhagwati has
argued, "the GATT trading system has achieved unprecedented trade expansion and
world prosperity" (Bhagwati qtd. in Mandle, 2003).
1 These founding nations were: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile,
China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Syria, South Africa, United Kingdom and the
United States. (http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/chrono.htm)
The initial rounds of multilateraltrade talks were a great success. While
ignoring the larger issues of subsidies and import licensing, by 1950, the third GATT
round resulted in 8700 tariff concessions, which amounted to a25 o/o cul of the 1948
tariff levels ("Timeline," BBC News, 2OO4). These results were based upon the
principles of "liberalization, equal market access, reciprocity, non-discrimination and
transparency" (Peet, 2003, p. 150). One of the most important arrangements was the
'non-discrimination'principle, which created the mosf favored nation (MFN) status
that claimed a universal application of tariff reductions or increases to all signatory
countries, so that every nation receives the 'same'treatment as the 'most favored'
nation (World Bank, 2002, p. 197tf). While these and subsequent tariff cuts, such as
during the Kennedy Round in 1963-67, resulted in significant reductions worth
approximately around $50 billion dollars of world trade, the agricultural sector largely
remained ataboo ("Timeline," BBC News,2004).
4. Breaking a Taboo: The Agricultural Sector
The reasoning behind the lack of liberalization in the agricultural sector prior
to 1980s has been attributed largely to the political, social and economical context of
the post-War period. Politically, entering the Cold War era and having witnessed the
deadliest wars of mankind, countries retreated to a practice of self-sufficient
agriculture as a'security' concern. Consequently, while manufactured goods covered
under the GATT were freely traded, agricultural goods were still heavily protected
and internally supported. This action was socially supported by the widespread
experiences o{ food stamps and shortages during the interwar years and
consequently food security and food sovereignty2 received a very high priority among
policy makers (lngco and Nash, 2OO4, p.25).
ln terms of political economic reasoning, agriculturaltrade was explicitly
excluded, as demanded by the US, from consideration i the GATT, as stated in
Article Xl:2c on import and Article XVI:3 on export exceptions. These articles allowed
for using nontaritf border measures and agriculturalexport subsidies to exist
"provided they were not used to gain 'more than an equitable share of the world
trade"'(ibid., p.25).
2 The term food sovereigntywas coined lirst by members of Via Campesina, an international
coalition of peasant farm groups who raised of awareness for the adverse consequences of
economic globalization at the World Food Summit +5 in Rome in 2002. "Food sovereignty
emphasizes the right of each nation to protect and regulate domestic agricultural production
and trade to achieve sustainability, guarantee a livelihood for farmers, and assure its citizens
are fed. Food sovereignty does not negate trade, states Via Campesina; "it promotes the
formulation of trade policies and practices that serve the rights of peoples to safe, healthy
and ecologically sustainable production." (http://www.ncrlc.com/food_sovereignty.html)
On a broader scale, protectionist policies were rising as developed nations
increasingly focused on creating a stable export-focused agricultural sector. As a
matter of fact, the European Economic Community (EEC) devised the now famous
protectionist and trade-distorting Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in 1958 (ibid.,
p.25). lts counterpart, the US and its agricultural industry on the other hand, greatly
benefited from increased emand in a post-war Europe in the process of
modernization a d reconstruction. Supportive of domestic production conditions, a
major policy shift occurred uring the 1970s in the US with the introduction of the
1973 Farm Bill. This bill, which similar to its successors was highly vested by
powerful agro-industry lobbyists, "removed production constraints on American
farmers and encourage commercial exports, [...]fundamentally alter[ing] the relation
of American agriculture tothe world economy" (McMichael, 1998, p.3). In summary,
given the increasing importance of internationaldevelopment, such as food aid, and
the chorological limited, yet powerful reach of the Green Revolution, the 1970s was a
period characterized by vast global demand and an increase in yield and 'green
production'(Ledermann, 2003).
However, with vast increases in production output, the global markets in the
1980s proved to be unable to sustain this demand as overproduction occurred and
prices for agricultural goods collapsed, putting reat strain on the feasibility of
protectionist agriculturaf policies (lngco and Nash, 2OO4, p.26). This increased stress
on farmers' incomes occurred simultaneously with a vast increase of the numbers of
nations having joined the GATT and the increasing importance of developing nations
as food import markets. As McMichael points out, while the developing nations only
accounted for ten o/o of all wheat imports, this figure increased to 57 "/" by 1980,
accounting for vast market-opportunities hatwere 'to be explored'by the
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industrialized First World (1998, p.3). Thus, by the 1980s, the agricultural world
market "becarne a battlefield in which countries fought with export subsidies [and
other methodsl for market shares" (Rieger qtd. in Rieger and Leibfried, 2004, p.88).
It was within this context of rising agricultural production, toughening
international competition and the increasing interests of industrialized countries to
seek export markets that the GATT trade ministers, under the leadership of the
United States, launched the Uruguay Bound, the "most ambitious and far-reaching
trade round so far" ("Trade," BBC News,2004).
5. Setting the Stage: The Uruguay Round
The Uruguay Round, which was named after Punta del Este, Uruguay where
the initial meeting took place, was established in 1986 and lasted until its successful
conclusion i  Marrakesh in 1994, which marked the establishing of the WTO as
predecessor to the GATT and created an enforcement arm. While characterized by
failure and upsets, such as the walkout by delegations ofagricultural exporting
countries in 1990 in Brussels, its grandest achievement, the Uruguay Round
Agreement on Agriculture (URAA), has carried on its influence as the founding
document far into the post-Uruguay, WTO setting. As Richard Peet states, "the
Uruguay Round [...] represented not a swan song but a phoenix for international
trade agreements" (2003, p.153).
Accompanied with major new trade agreements, uch as the Agreement on
Textiles and Clothing, this multilateral trade round was marked by the successful
integration ofagriculture into the free-trade complex. Furthermore, the Uruguay
Round has been successful in "brin[ing] the United States back into the fold of GATT
rules and procedures" after it has largely frustrated its trading partners with erosive
use of unilateraltrade r taliation, justified as'leveling the playing field'(Tussie and
Glover, 1993, p.22-23)
While major agreements regulating trade, such as the well-critiqued
Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of lntellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), the
Trade-related lnvestment Measures (TRIMS) and the General Agreement on Trade
in Services (GATS), have often taken center-stage (Shiva, 2000;Wade, 2003), l
intend to focus in the following section on the major achievements in reducing tariffs
and subsidies provided in the 21 articles and the annexes of the URAA.
As mentioned earlier, agricultural products were largely exempt from previous
tariff negotiations. Consequently, countries often applied tariffs and non-tariff
measures (NTMs), such as "quotas, import bans and embargoes" to regulate and
protect their vulnerable domestic agricultural sector (lngco and Nash, 2004, p.271.
5.1 URAA: Tariff Reductions
The URAA laid the groundwork for several rules on market access, export
subsidies and domestic support levels in the agricultural sector. The first step
undertaken by negotiators was an agreement to align agricultural trade rules with
those applying to trade in manufacturing goods. In addition, they also called for
increased transparency through a process called 'tariffication' (ibid., p.28). Under
Article 4, Market Access, tariffication i volved the merging of NTMs into tariffss,
through a calculation of the difference between domestic and world market price.
Upholding the most-favored nation and non-discriminatory p inciple, developed
countries then subsequently devoted themselves to a reduction i  tariff equivalents
by an "average of 36 o/o and a minimum of 15 "/" over six years and developing
countries by an average of 2O "h and a minimum of 1O "/" over 10 years" (ibid., p.28).
Furthermore, tariff bindings were put in place meaning that nations, having lowered
their tariffs, "agreed to hold the tariffs at the new lower level" (Mandle, 2003, p.12).
However this commitment to agricultural tariff reductions contained two
major flaws. First, the cuts were not weighted for the volume of trade, meaning that it
' NTMs (Nontariff measures) are policy or practices that alters the conditions of
international trade besides tariffs. Most prominently, used interchangeably with tariff barriers,
these include import and export quotas.
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heavily favored larger agricultural export nations. Second, and even more gravely, as
lngco and Nash accurately point out, "the reduction commitments were based on
'average cuts' rather than cuts in the average tariff", resulting in the strange situation
that if a tariff ol 1 "/" was cut to 0.5 7", a 50 7o reduction had taken place (2004, p.28).
Subsequently, the tariff cuts agreement was flawed in that it allowed a nation to cut
lower, lesser-important tariffs while protecting their most viable crops with minimum-
tariff cuts4.
This issue was further aggravated with the creation of Special Safeguard
(SSG) Provisions inArticle 5, which reserved the right to any WTO member who
undertook tariffication, to declare additionaltariffs if import prices fluctuate heavily.
As an example, a price-based SSG provision allows for the taritf to rise in case the
cost of the imported commodity falls. Consequently, the SSG tariff would act as a
compensatory mechanism "for the fixed tariff and reduces or eliminates the effect of
falling prices on the domestic market" (ibid., p.30). These safeguard mechanisms
were further supported by provisions which allowed for limitations and exceptions to
the earlier mentioned bound tariffs.s
However, while certain loopholes clearly favored the developed world, under
Article 15 of the URAA, special and differentialtreatment (S&D) has been put in
place to allow an expansion of 'development space'to developing nations'
agricultural sector. Being conscious of the particular needs and conditions of
developing countries in the implementation f market access commitments,
negotiators accepted that "least-developed countries did not have to make any
4 As it should become obvious to the reader, an evaluation of the prospects of an agreement
on trade involves a lawyer-like analysis, trying to get past vague and imprecise language.
5 For example, Article XX of the GATT 1994 allows for import restrictions based upon a
variety of concerns, including the "protection of human, anima, or plant life for health, reasons
of public morals and protection of nationaltreasures" (lngco and Nash, 2004., p. 29).
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reduction commitments on tariffs, domestic support, or export competition" (ibid.,
p.35). Furthermore, reduction commitment in export and domestic subsidies for
developing countries were fairly lower. However due to their general monetary
constraints inproviding subsidies in the first place, they were of little importance and
effect.
5.2 URAA: Domestic Support
While tariff reductions have been a key component, the most contentious and
ambitious point of argument at the negotiations focused on the domestic support
farmers received. Covered under Article 6, reduction commitments for subsidies
were singled out as a major goal towards reducing trade distortion, as it was
generally perceived that domestic support of agricultural production has led in the
past to overproduction, resulting in decoupling agricultural production from the
dynamics of supply and demand of the market. This overproduction i turn has led to
excess stockpiles of commodities that were 'looking'for a purchaser. In order to
create demand, as world market prices were much lower than domestic prices,
export subsidies were consequently put in place in addition to the domestic
subsidies, in order to sell their goods on the globat market.
For this purpose, and to increase visibility, distorting agricultural subsidies
were classified into boxes "using the traffic tight approach, with red for prohibited
subsidies, amber for subsidies that had to slow down, and green for nontrade-
distorting subsidies" (ibid., p.31). While negotiators decided to deal with the red box,
which covered export subsidies, separately, a new blue box, which figures as a
transitional 'box' between the amber and green box, was created and "considered to
be less-trade distorting than market price supports (see Appendix Itor overall chart
of the boxes and Appendix lllor US examples of boxes).
Applying these classifications and delving into the details, Article 6 calls for a
reduction in domestic subsidies in the most trade-distorting amber box in excess of
demin imis levelsof  5o/" fordevelopedand 1Oo/otor  developingcountr iesof  thetota l
value of agricultural production. Based upon the 1986 - 1988 base periods,
developed and developing countries made reduction commitments of 20 %by 2O00
and 13.3 7o respectively by 2004 (ibid., p. 31).
An example on how these reductions were calculated is based upon the
calculation of the total Aggregate Measurement of Support, as outlined in Article 6,
Annex 3 and Annex 4. Analyzing the below example provided for by the WTO (see
below), the only product- and non-product specific support measures that were
included are the ones in excess of the 5 "/o de minimis threshold of developed
country x in year y. Based upon these calculations, a nation x would have had to cut
its total AMS by 20 7o until2000.
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Source: WTO.
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/ag_introo3_domestic_e.htm#box
However, due to several exemptions and loopholes mentioned earlier, such
as input subsidies provided for low-income, resource poor farmers or measures
taken in order to strengthen domestic food security, and the fact that the 1986-1988
base period on which cuts were based was marked by historically high support levels
resulted in few actual reductions of domestic subsidies and cuts. While several
governments have simply shifted their support levels from the amber to the lesser-
distorting blue box, a practice commonly known as "box-shifting", other countries,
such as the US, did not have to undertake any reductions, as "reforms undertaken
prior to the negotiations were adequate to fulfill the new rules on reducing domestic
support" (ibid., p.36).
5.3 URAA: Export Subsidies
The third major issue was reduction in export subsidies, the former red box.
These export reductions, as stated in Article 9.2, "require that members reduce
export subsidies by 21 "/" in volume and 36 7" in value over the six-year period from
1995 to 2OOO" (ibid., p.33). These figures were again spatially differentiated for
developing countries, for which the reduction commitments were "14 "h in volume
and 24 7o in value over a 1O-year period from 1995 to 2004" (ibid., p.33).
These exemptions were not universal in application, as developing country
members did not have to reduce subsidies that are geared towards "marketing
exports of agricultural products [...] and internal transport and freight charges on
export shipments [...]." (Article 9.4, WTO, AoA) Furthermore, WTO members agreed
to "prohibit the introduction of new export subsidies for agricultural products" in a
similar feat of export subsidies binding (Economic Research Service, 2004).
While export subsides have been reduced since 1995, "high levels of export
subsidies remain and continue to distort world markets" (lngco and Nash, 2OO4,
p.36). While the Agreement's main achievement has been hailed as to eliminate "all
export subsidies for agricultural products over six year for developed countries, ten
for less developed countries, with the least-developed countries being exempted",
only little progress has been achieved so far (Peet, 2003, p.153). The EU is still
accounting for 90 o/o of all OECD export subsidies, which have been found most
commonly among diary and sugar products as opposed to grains, oilseeds and
cotton (Economic Research Service, 2001). [See Appendix lllJ
ln summary, as illustrated inthe table below, the Agreement on Agriculture
reached at the end of the Uruguay Round resulted in the following required
reductions and opened the road for the founding of the WTO and the start of the
Doha negotiation Round. lt is important to note, that these final details of the AoA
were largely "decided bilaterally between the USA and the EC in the now infamous
Blair House Accord in 1992" (Jawara nd Kwa, 2003, p.26tf). it should come as no
surprise then that the US was largely able to 'fine-tune'the modalities of the
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agreement and established legal loopholes, such as the Green and Blue Boxes and
the earlier mentioned 'box-shifting.' Nevertheless, uccessful completion of the
URAA and the transition from the GATT to the WTO marked an important stepping-
stone for the developing nations into the international trade regime and the first major
WTO trade round, Doha (Tussie and Lengyel).
6 The Least Developed Countries, LCDs, are: Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso,
Burundi, CentralAfrican Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, The
Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali,
Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon
lslands, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia (Source:WTO)
20
Reduction Commitments
in AoA
Developed
Countries
(1 995-2000)
Developing
Countries
(1995-2005)
Least
Developed
Countries6
Tariffs
Average cut for all agricultural
products
Minimum cut per product
(base period 1986-88)
36 Yo
15o/o
24 o/"
10% None
Domestic support
Total agriculture support cut
(base period 1986-88)
200h 73"/" None
Export Subsidies
Value of subsidies
Subsidized quantities
(base period 1986 - 90)
36%
21 o/"
24%
14 "/" None
Source: Economic Research Service, "WTO:...", 2004
6. Entering the Doha Round
After the collapse of the Seattle WTO summit in 1999, the inability to reach
consensus on such diverse issues as trade in services, operations of development
and liberalization f agriculture painted a dark picture of future trade negotiations.
However, while we best remember the more than 30,000 anti-WTO protestors and
the police force as the reason for the summit's failure, Jeffrey J. Schott argues that
ultimately, "the WTO meeting fellvictim no to protests outsrde in the streets, but
rather to serious substantive disagreements rnslde the convention centef' (2000,
p.5). Thus, while a vast majority of countries were eager to "expand the WTO
agenda beyond the issues mandated by the Uruguay Round accords", conflicts of
interests existed on how to proceed with them (ibid., p.6).
Given the mandate in Article 20 in the URAA for continued negotiations on
agriculture starting in 2000, the potential of these talks was controversial when the
WTO launched the broader Doha Round and its Doha Development Agenda in
November 2001 in Doha, Qatar. While some regarded this newest rade round
launch as a "positive development", others painted a starkly different picture (lngco
and Nash, 2OO4, p.37). As Jawara and Kwa point out, developing countries "were
bullied and coerced into acquiescing with an 'agreement'with which most of them
profoundly disagreed. [...1 all that the developing countries achieved for their
strenuous efforts was the label 'The Doha Development Agenda'[, a Ministerial
declaration on TRIPs and Public Health, and agreement that negotiations on the
'singapore issues'would begin on the basis of 'explicit consensus'on the modalities
of negotiations at Cancun" (Jawara and Kwa, 2003, p.xv).
6.1 The Failure of Cancun
Meeting in Cancun, this later topic proved to be the most contentious, as the
Singapore issues foresaw the expansion of the rights of foreign investors, the
establishing of a competition policy, which would regulate cartels and increase
competition between local and foreign firms, including for government contracts
(Africa Renewal, 2004, p.24). Failing to reach a consensus among its 147 members
body again, the Doha Development Round negotiations came to an abrupt halt in
Cancun, Mexico, in September 2OO3 over a series of disagreements concerning the
details of the agricultural greements and the extent of non-agricultural agreements,
such as the Singapore issues. Ultimately, itwas conference chair, Mexican Foreign
Minister Luis Ernest Derbez, who closed the meeting and the conference, resulting in
a widespread blame-game of which countries'delegates were at fault and signs of
jubilation and frustration on both sides. These mixed reactions ranged from "civil
society representatives [that] broke out in song and dance in the convention centre"
to US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick "clearly sulking, [throwing] a tantrum in
his final press conference" (Jawara and Kwa, 2003, p.xxi).
While many factors certainly have contributed to the collapse of the trade
talks, the common main factor that has been attributed with it is the fact that
developing countries were able for a first successfultime to maintain their high level
of cohesion, such as displayed in their powerful creation of the G20, in face of strong
efforts by the US and the EU to "divide and rule" and use "arm-twisting and bullying"
in order to achieve their preferred outcomes (Jawara and Kwa, 2003, p.xxxvi
ff.;Narlikar and Tussie, 2004, p.947tt). Consequently, while previous efforts to apply
development aid and bilateralfree trade agreements as sticks and carrots have been
able to coerce developing nations into a less favorable outcome, they have failed to
bear fruits as the G20, under the leadership of Brazil and India, still consists
presently of 19 membersT. As Narlikar and Tussie point out, this historical
achievement seems to "suggest that the G20 is a product of almost wo decades of
learning by developing countries" (ibid., p.948).
6.2 The Threat of the Demise of the WTO
Having failed to reach an agreement in the Doha Round and having fallen
behind the timetable, many trade analysts put the WTO's 'constitutional' head on the
chopping-block and argued that another failure to resolve the key issue of agriculture
could result in the total collapse of the WTO. Given this bleak outlook, intense
backroom negotiations developed which involved continued 'green-room'power-
political negotiations between the developed and developing agriculturalexporters.
White "developing country delegates formally registered their disappointment at a
missed opportunity", behind closed doors they "were jubilant" (Jawara and Kwa,
2003, p.xxii). This spirit of having achieved a milestone in the process of multilateral
negotiations carried on even to previous supporters of developed countries, such as
South African Trade Minister Alec Erwin. who stated that "this is the first time we
have experienced a situation where, by combining our technical expertise, we can sit
as equals at the table. This is a change in the quality of negotiations between
developing and developed countries" (Elliot et al., qtd. in Jawara and Kwa, 2003,
p.xxi i i) .
7 Members include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia,
Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand,
Venezuela and Zimbabwe. (lxv)
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7. Scripting a Fairy-Tale: The Geneva Framework Agreement
ln the night of July 31", WTO negotiators came out of their closed doors
negotiations and announced that a "breakthrough agreement" had been reached that
would keep the previously doomed Doha Development Round alive (WTO News,
2004). While the evaluation of its content might be controversial, it is generally
agreed that this Geneva Framework Agreement marks a major step towards the
continued iscussion on trade liberalization i  agriculture, as it proposes new and
more precise commitments on the three pillars of domestic support, export
competition and market access. While it contains hardly any quantifications and it is
still a'diamond in the rough', it neveftheless presents itself as a key-document with
great interest for further empirical and structural analysis.
ln the following sections, I will evaluate the Framework agreements
achievements intwo steps: First, I evaluate the institutional break that occurred at
the meeting as a departure point from previously failed negotiations. Second, I will
investigate the Framework's major achievements and its perceived winners and
losers.
7.1 Bypassing the Ministers
First, from an institutional perspective, as Kwa and Bello point out, the
meeting marked a significant break from the earlier meetings in the Doha Round
which had resulted in a near collapse of the WTO. Because these previous
ministerialmeetings in Cancun in 2003 and Seattle 1999 had resulted ultimately in
stalemate, the General Councilmeeting of the Summer 2004 established itself as "de
facto the supreme institution for decision making" (Bello and Kwa, 2AOq. As the
previous ministerial meeting included NGOs and popular protesters, as well as
increasing media attention, the leading nations came to the realization that trade
negotiators, which were largely partisan politicians, were more "determined tostand
up for their country's interests" (ibid.). lt was this sense of increased scrutiny and
transparency that was attributed with the failure of these negotiations.
Learning from this past backfire, the main negotiators, under the leadership
of the FIPS (Five interested Parties), which included the US, EU, Australia, Brazil
and India, pushed for a new decision to be made within a smaller gathering of only
40 trade ministers during their July General Council meeting. Moving swiftly and
often without giving other countries the chance and needed time for review, they
produced shortly after midnight on 1'r of August 2OO4 the Framework agreement,
"which Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi said will greatly enhance members'
chance for successfully completing the important Doha negotiations" (WTO News,
2004).
7.2'Progress' on Agricultural Liberalization?
This apparent lack of transparency and system of exclusion seems to greatly
coincide with the practice of the "Green Room", which "had traditionally provided a
way to expedite consultations" through the inclusion of only a few core countries and
thus "underpinning the claims of a'democratic deficit"'(Tussie and Lengyel, p.7).
In addition, this process of bypassing other state actors has also included a
further inclusion of non-governmental organizations and WTO critics in general.
Consequently, strengthening the role of state actors, the WTO has purposefully
channeled and filtered any opposition that could occur on a national basis by
accepting only a single voice per nation as a trade representative. As was the case,
this ult imately resulted in the silencing of crit ical voices within the US of the
Framework agreement while large agribusiness and lobbying roups have lauded
United States Trade Representative (USTR) Zoellick on their positive and close
discussions through all processes.
Finally, this process of creating an 'arbitrary' core group is aggravated by the
fact that few developing countries hold the resources and expertise necessary to
delegate a permanent representative to those meetings. As one is unsure of whether
or not they will result in a 'constructive' Framework, they often have to take a gamble
on how to allocate their limited time and funding.s Confronted with these constraints,
many developing countries find it difficult to find a balance between "crafting a
consistent proposal with due attention [and] the equally relevant requirements of
efficiency and legitimacy" (ibid. , p.7').The evaluation of the 'consensus-based'
Framework agreement is thus still up in the air, as both analysts and developing
nations are trying to ascertain its implications.
The Framework agreements major achievement, building onto the URAA,
can be divided into three subsections in a similar fashion as the Agreement on
Agriculture during the Uruguay Round: export competition, domestic support and
market access. First, export competition has been hailed as the negotiators'greatest
achievements in furthering trade liberalization, as"all forms of export subsidies are to
be eliminated in parallels , and disciplines on all export measures established, with
I As a matter of fact, more than 100 nations were absent during the negotiations of the
Framework agreement.
e lt is important to note, as Christian Haeberli points out, that the phasing-out of the complete
armory of export competition instruments is more likely to look like a "disarmament treaty:
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equivalent effect, "by a credible end date" (Haeberli, 2004, p.4ff). The measures to
be el iminated include export credits and insurance programs, trade distort ing
practices of state trading enterprises, and food aid leading to commercial
displacement" (ibid.). While no clear timeline does yet exist, the modalities will result
in significant cutbacks and changes in the US, in terms of export credits and food
aid.10 However, because a f inal date is yet to be determined, French Agriculture
Minister Herve Gaymard is on record as stating that it could be "2O15 to 2017 before
European export subsidies are tinally eliminated" (Africa Renewal, 2004, p.3). As a
matter of fact, as Christian Haeberli points out, "they finally accepted it only on the
understanding that the phase-in of these discipl ines would l ikely last for up to 10
years" (ibid., p.6).
Secondly, while the export competition issue is by no means written in stone,
the domestic support pi l lar is by far more complex both in terms of lack of
quantitat ive data as well as ambiguous definit ions. In general, the Framework
agreement requires al l  subsidizing members to "reduce the overal l  sum of their
trade-distortive subsidiesll. This reduction will have to occur with a tiered approach,
meaning that higher subsidies levels would get cut more than lower. A reduction of at
least 20 % has been agreed on for the first year of implementation, which should be
at the latest December 2005, which has been set as the extended "deadline for
concluding the round" (Africa Renewal, 2004). This cut of 20 7o, as noted by
Haeberli, is the same amount as has been achieved "over the whole Uruguay Round
Indeed, exporters today enjoying overnmental support of any kind will not agree to phase
those payments out unless they are given sufficient assurances that their competitors will not
benefit from support measures with a similar effect." (Haeberli, 2004, p.1tt)10 Critique was very vocal in the EU, which has been heavily criticized by its own member
states, such as France; and by Canada, which holds state trading agencies
11 These trade supporting subsidies have been defined as Amber Box, Blue Box and de
minimis support.
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implementation period" and consequently as worthy of being termed a 'breakthrough'
(Haeberli, 2004, p.7tt).
In terms of the absolute actual results of these cuts, a variety of opinions
exist. While Haeberli suggests that they might pose a great challenge to the US, this
claim is disputed as calculations with present numbers have shown. Thus, currently
the US is spending around 23 billion $ in subsidies annually over the last three years,
which is well under the 49 $ billion it would be allowed to use according to agreement
calculations (Africa Renewal, 2004). This calculation results on the fact that the "sum
of all trade-distorting support will not exceed 80 % of the sum of Final Bound Total
AMS plus permitted de minims plus the Blue Box," of which the Blue Box level will be
the higher amount of a 'representative period' so that the base for cut will be higher
than the actual blue box usage. Thus, on Blue Box payments, the Framework text
provides that such support "will not exceed 5 "h of a Member's average total value of
agricultural production during an historical period" (Haeberli, 2004). However, even
there exceptions exist, so that members with very high Blue Box levels, such as
Norway, would not have to make "a wholly disproportionate cut" (ibid.).
Many critics of this interpretation argue that the effect of the Agricultural
Framework Agreement on developed countries is not actual reduction, but simply the
earlier mentioned shifting around of payments from box to box, which in case of the
US is most likely to occur away from the illegal Amber box towards the Green and
Blue boxes. Haeberli however argues that the "gateway from Amber Support (AMS
or de minimis) to Blue Box measures is likely to be a narrow one, as the solution of
product-specilic cappingl2 has been introduced. Overall, "it remains to be seen
12 Product-specific apping basically refers to the idea that certain maximum levels across the
various boxes will be identitied for each product so that a simple 'shifting'of boxes no longer
whether the additional obligation to reduce support on a product basis will also apply
to sensitive products" (ibid.).
The third grand pillar that has been included in the Framework Agreement is
market access. Synchronous to the domestic subsidies cuts, a tiered formula will be
applied here, meaning that tariffs will be divided into "different bands depending on
their respective bound tariff level" (ibid.). While Least Developed Countries would be
excluded from any reduction commitments, harmonization would occur in both
developing and developed countries, resulting in higher tariffs being cut more than
lower ones.
However, these reduction methodologies have yet to be defined, as well as
how the bound tariffs are going to be classified. As Haeberli notes, "in order to
accommodate the US delegation, capping remains on the table but only as a subject
which 'will be further evaluated"' (ibid.). Countries however are still able to apply the
'sensitive products' rule. As stated in Paragraph 31, o'members may designate an
appropriate number, to be negotiated, of tariff lines to be treated as sensitive" if they
don't undermine "the overall objective of the tiered approach" (WTO in Appendix).
While this heavily favors export nations with only a few products, such as the US, as
opposed to lndia, which exports more than 100 different agricultural commodities,
developing nations have been granted some extra maneuver room as their products
are generally subject to lesser reduction commitments. Furthermore, developing
nations also would be able to designate "Special Products" (SP) based on the
previously established criteria of food security, l ivel ihood security and rural
developmental needs.
is feasible. lt is important to note though, that a phalanx of developed nations, e.g.
Switzerland, Japan, are opposed to this feature, fearing that this would cut into their high-
levels of 'Green Box'subsidies.
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In summary, thus, the three main pil lars under negotiation for further
liberalization marks a milestone in the WTO's history and the developing countries
struggle towards free and fair trade. However, in every single pillar there exist clear
drawbacks towards further liberalization of agricultural trade. For example, while a
general increase in export competition superficially appears to be beneficial for the
developing nations, it also reduces previously held favorable statuses. Haeberli
questions the benefits sub-Saharan African countries wil l receive from the
agreement, as it would "considerably increase" their food bills "without being able to
substantially improve their market shares abroad or even at home" due to eradication
of previously favorable tariff preferences in Europel3 1Haeberli,2OO4, p.6). In
addition, the breakthrough on market access is questionable as the main modalities
and figures still have to be worked out. These detailed figures will essentially
determine whether or not the more lenient treatment of sensitive products for
example wil l offset any possible gains in terms of further reductions of tariff.
However, as seen in the issue on domestic subsidies with the possibility of box-
shifting, it appears that every member country that has the resources available to
support its farming constituency wil l most l ikely explore all possible ways of
continuing do so. Consequently, while the proximate victors of the agreement might
appear to be the developing nations in the short term, the ultimate winners could
again be the large industrialized farming nations that have the legal and monetary
13 As a matter of fact, these preferential access agreements to the markets of the developed
world are one of the reasons "third world remained aloof form the negotiations organized by
the GATT." (Mandle, p.14) However, economist Krueger argues that "most analysts believe
that, although GSP [Generalized System of Preferences] had some value to developing
countries, it was limited to a few countries and a few commodities [and that] it may not have
been worth even the diplomatic efforts and other costs to developing countries." (Krueger,
1995, p.40 as quoted in Mandle, p.14)
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resources to support heir farmers, successfully argue their case at the WTO and
benefit from freer markets elsewhere.
7.3 The'Fifth Wheel': Singapore and Cotton
Further issues that were discussed included, but were not limited to, the
Singapore issues and cotton, which were two of the reasons for failure of the Cancun
agreement. While the Singapore issues, which consist of a "mixed bag, relating to
investment, competit ion policy, trade facil i tation, and transparency" have been
largely dropped by the European Union and have been reduced to a simple
commitment to take them up in later negotiations, the cotton issue has remained on
the table (Bhagwati, 2OO4). With developing nations pushing for an expedited
solution to the currently unstable and unfair market situation, cotton has been
specifically integrated into the agreement, receiving special attention in an "ambitious
and expeditious manner." Thus a subcommittee for cottonla was established in 18rh
November, 2004.
This subcommittee for cotton was established in the face of a dispute
settlement case brought by Brazil and joined by several other countries, including
four Central and West African nations, Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin and Chad. As
argued by Oxfam, one of the largest international NGOs working in favor of 'fair and
free trade' for the developing world context, "agricultural subsidies in the United
States are at the heart of a deep crisis in the world cotton markets" (Oxfam, 2002, p.
2). lt is challenging that with cotton prices, adjusted for inflation, having fallen to their
lowest level since 1930s due to overproduction, more than 10 million producers that
depend "directly on cotton production" have been pushed to the brink of starvation
14 As of March 22nd,2005, the Sub-Committee on Cotton does holds its own site at the WTO
which will be continuously updated with releases of progresses. For more information, feel
free to consult http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/agric e/cotton subcommittee .htm
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and poverty (ibid., p.2). Arguing that Central and West African nations enjoy a
'comparative advantage' in the production of cotton, which is as much as three times
lower than in the US in terms of production cost, US cotton subsidies are unfairly
inflating the market, as they 'kick in' when prices are their lowest. Consequently,
based upon a study undertaken by the International Cotton Advisory Committee
(ICAC) which showed that the withdrawal of US cotton subsidies "would raise cotton
prices by 1 1 cents per pound, or by 26 o/o", Oxfam argues that the region lost more
than 300 million dollars and demanded compensatory payments (ibid., p.1ff).
However, these compensatory payments have not been granted. As Jagdish
Bhagwati argues, these demands were "simply unrealistic and inappropriate" as
compensating others for the effects of their own policies would set a precedent which
would open up a "Pandora's Box" (2004). Consequently, the African states agreed to
the US proposal of establishing a special subcommittee, in a quid-pro-quo deal for
eliminating their demand of compensation. Nevertheless, in September, 2004,
following the Agricultural Framework Agreement, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
upheld an earlier preliminary ruling that the "US had paid illegal subsides worth 3.2
billion dollars" to its cotton farmers ("Brazil," BBC News, 2OO4). While the US has
appealed the dispute ruling in October 2004, claiming that all of its subsidies are
legal within the present system, Phil Bloomer from Oxfam International remarked the
most recent ruling as "a triumph for developing countries" (ibid.).
Consequently, even the cotton dispute, while largely pointing in favor of
Brazil, has not yet been 'won' and given the US mastery of box-shifting of subsidies,
it could come as no surprise that by the end of the ruling, it will have again relocated
8. Outlook
Granted the complexities of the WTO systems and its agreements, it is
difficult without further investigation a d actual case studies to provide for an
accurate and sound outlook on the winners and losers of the agreements.
Nevertheless, I have been able to show the degree to which power-politics have
shaped the particular outcomes in agricultural negotiations over a historical period of
time. However, as the recent developments with the rise of the G20 coalition has
shown, the past, quasi-hegemonic power-imbalance in favor of the heavy-hitters US
and EU has slowly, even if only momentarily, shifted towards a'truer consensus-
based system'of the WTO.
However, this statement again needs to be differentiated as seen in the
recent Framework agreement, which has been pushed for by the US, and heavily
favors large food export nations that are able to effectively use the WTO's loopholes,
box shifting methods, etc.. Furthermore, the agreement supports a'return'to a more
state-centric model of analysis, as NGOs and WTO critics have largely been
sidelined and bypassed, or at least 'censured and filtered'through t eir own state's
trade representatives.
Finally, the looming question eeds to be posed whether or not trade
liberalization, even if 'fairer'will benefit developing nations as a whole. While short-
term benefits are likely to be harvested a more serious interrogation needs to take
place. ln the next section, I will investigate the agricultural sectors of the US, Mali
and South Africa in order to determine the present and past structures of agricultural
production and possibilities and hurdles that would stand in the way of change.
9. Declared Victors and other winners: Investigation of the
Agricultural Sectors of US, Mali and South Africa
As becomes obvious from the previous chapter, these current developments
raise various questions on who are the winners and losers of the Geneva greement
and the Cotton Dispute Settlement. Investigating the reactions in the various
agricultural sectors and ministerial groups on a per country basis, I willfirst
investigate what the domestic reaction has been to the 'historical' breakthrough in
the public and private sphere. Secondly, I undertake an independent analysis based
on commodities of the impact of the Framework agreement.
9.1 Setting the stage in the United States
The United States, acting as the most powerful actor in the present global
world order, had an enormous take in keeping the Doha Round Trade talks alive.16
Spending in the year 2000 more than the combined grossed omestic product of 70
nations, the United States not only had a great stake in finding export markets but
also in providing continued support for its domestic farmers and the strong political
constituencies they constitute. After the collapse of Cancun, Robert Zoellick, US
Trade Representative "responded [...] by letting recriminations fly" (Bhagwati, 2004).
In a FinancialTimes letter to the editor, Mr. Zoellick threatened bilateral trade
agreements with "can do" developing countries that "have withstood pressure to join
the strife from larger developing neighbors" (2003). Consequently, adding pressure
on the G-20 and other developing nations that have insisted on compensation for
16 lt is important to note that I purposefully did not use the term "hegemonic" in order to
portray my sense that in agricultural negotiations, the European Union has almost the same
amount of say, especially because of its 'larger-than-life' CAP program supporting farmers
through controversial Blue Box measures.
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cotton, fought measures of protectionism for their own agricultural sectors and the
liberalizirrg Singapore issues, he threatened that "as WTO members ponder the
future, the US will not wait: we will move towards free trade with can-do countries"
(ibid.).
Having ained Fast-Track authority by President Bush, something that has
not been achieved in the last years under President Clinton, Zoellick traveled the
world (and the USA) immediately after Cancun with a "trip [he]took around 32'000
miles up and down the world to get a sense of the view of the key colleagues"
(Zoellick, 2004). These stops included, but were not limited to Kenya, South Africa,
China, Japan, Pakistan, lndia and of course the European Union. lt is within this
context of the establishing of the earlier mentioned FIPS that the current Framework
was drafted and later agreed upon by the General Council.
While he certainly had to make certain successions to the European Union
and other developed nations, such as Norway and Switzerland, in terms of the
capping of tariffs and amount of amber box reductions, he was largely able to 'box'
through his country's tance on agriculturaltrade liberalization. Given the realization
that new markets are needed in order to provide for the excess productivity of the US
agricultural sector, his efforts were applauded not only by the government, but as
well by large special interest groups and transnational companies. As a matter of
fact, in a statement released by the 'AgTrade Coalition', which consists of such
powerful members as the American Farm Bureau Federation (FB), and the leading
US-agro multinationals Cargill and Monsanto, they "congratulate U.S. negotiators for
a successful conclusion to the negotiations", stressing that the agreement provides
for the "expansion of access to highly restricted foreign markets", a mission
American agriculture has long sought o achieve (AFBF, 2OO4). As Bob Stallman,
President of the American Farm Bureau Federation has remarked,
"the framework text adopted by the WTO General Council will continue the
process of negotiation toward the goal of expanding world markets for American
agriculture [and]will lead to expanded market access for U.S. farmers and ranchers"
(ibid.).
It is within this context that the Framework has been declared overall a victory
as it achieved the US Agricultural Secretary's, Ann M. Veneman, goals of "significant
improvements in market access; substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic
support ; and in a historic move, the complete limination ofexport subsidies"
("Statement", USDA, 2004).
What becomes obvious in the study of the major governmental nd non-
governmental ctors'reactions is the widespread optimism within the agricultural
sector in the United States that the Framework will have no or only little negative
repercussions ontheir own livelihoods. Backed with a20O2 farmbillwhich increases
US crop and dairy subsidies to farmers by more than 50 7o, one would expect he
'historic' Framework agreement to achieve the goals of liberalizing domestic
subsidies reduction in the US and the world as a whole (FASS Track, 2OO2).
However, as Zoellick reassured in a letter to then-Democratic leader Tom Daschle of
South Dakota, "this reduction will not weaken our ability to support our farmers [...]"
(Organic Consumer Association, 2004). As a matter of fact, based upon the
calculation formula devised in the earlier section, the 20 7o cut taken from the 49
billion $ of annual maximum subsidies the US would be allowed to have will not
affect its current projected commitment of 23 billion $ of subsidies per year.
Having presented a general overview, in the following commodity analysis, I
will investigate to what extent his interpretation of a victory might be differentiated
based on various scales, when investigating indetailthe cotton and maize sector.
9.2 The US Cotton Sector
The United States holds a key position in the global agricultural market as it
accounts for the world's largest exporter of cotton, as "in a typical year more than
half of US cotton is exported" (Oxfam, 2002, p.10). From a domestic perspective,
however, cotton farmers in the US are receiving vast amounts of subsidies.
Measured over a seven year period, from 1995 - 2OO2,204182 cotton farmers have
received around 10.7 billion $. (EWG) This figure accounts for the sth highest
subsidies program in the US, with corn subsidies being the greatest (34 billion $)
overall, yet lower per-capita payments. In terms of subsidies per acre, cotton
received around 230 dollars per acre, compared with corn, which amounted for
approximately 40 dollars per acre in 2001/2002 (Agricultural Outlook, June/July 2002
qtd. in Oxfam, 2OO2, p.33).
From a historical perspective, these subsidies, as shown here in the case of
cotton in Graph 1, have been largely on the increase and their respective increases
largely correlate with the falling world market price for cotton, due to "counter-cyclical
payments [that] are made when a commodity's effective price is below its target
price" (USDA, 2OO3). Consequently, their trade distorting effect, as reflected in the
increase in global cotton market export share during this 7 year period, can be
clearly detected in Graph 2.
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These subsidies programs (see Table 1) have been classified into 6
categories, with each respectively falling within one of the three subsidies boxes of
the WTO. The largest of these payments, with a total of over 4 billion dollars, the
Production Flexibility Contract in the 1997 Farm Bill, have been officially declared as
Green Box subsidies, however with the newest ruling in the Dispute Settlement Body
they will have to be declared as Amber Box. The second amber category payments
are Emergency Loss Payments (renamed counter-cyclical payments in the 2002
Farm Bill), which include the Market Loss Assistance of over 2 billion dollars. The
third Amber box payments are loan deficiency payments, which accounted for 1.7
billion dollars over that same period.
Frurgrams included in cotton subsidim
Direct payments, replacing earlier production flexibility contracts (PFC)
payments, have been put in place for cotton farmers under the 2OO2 Farm act
(USDA, 2003). These direct payments have been established "based on the value of
production and yields during a pervious production period" (Oxfam, 2002.)
Consequently, asthese standardized payments are decoupled from production and
present world prices, they are eligible for the Green Box. However, with a change of
Fraduqtion Flexibility Contrast - Upland Cctfon $4,$47,669,2.CI8
fiomrnoditl, C€rtificates - Cocp Cotbn $2,s09,698,72.6
C'onarncdity Cefificates - Cstlon $4CI5,055,344
Direat CCIunter Cyclical - Uplond Cntton $L84,610,470
Loan Sef" Fayment - Non PFC - Cotton $1,093,?84
Loan Deficiency - Cropland Factsr - Upland Cotton $-7,769
Lsan Smficie ncy - Ineligible - Cotton $-62,S71"
Loan Seficiency Fayment Lirnit - Upland €ottnn $-ffiCI,477
Froduction Flexibility Refund - Upland Cotton $-276,24.9
Sefieieney Final Faynrent - ELS cotton $-3,837,461
the reference period to 1998 -2OO1 (see Graph 1);the entitlement to subsidies has
increased substantially as these years represented increased acreage and yields
under production for cotton. Thus, during the period of 1995 - 2002, they accounted
for more than 4 billion dollars, or roughly 4O % of total cotton subsidies.
The second new introduction under the 2002 Farm Act was to replace the
emergency market loss payments with counter-cyclical p yments, which are amber
box support measures. The emergency market loss payments accounted between
1995 - 20O2for approximately 2 billion dollars, or 2O o/o of total cotton subsidies.
Estimates from the USDA Farm Service Agency for 2003 Crop Counter-cyclical
payments for cotton are 0.0393 dollars per pound of upland cotton (see Figure 1),
which is considerably below the estimate given by Oxfam in 2003 of 13 cents per
pound, "or one-third of the market value of the crop" (Oxfam, 2OO2l. lt consequently
becomes obvious that with the high volatility of the cotton market prices, so do the
overall subsidies payments vary considerably.
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A third measure are the loan deficiency payments, which are triggered
whenever "world prices fall below $0.52 per pound" resulting in the effect hat "the
further world prices fall below that level, the more [the loan deficiency payments and
marketing loan grainsl increase" (Oxfam, 2002, p.15). During our observed period,
they accounted for approximately 1.8 billion dollars, or 18 o/" of total cotton subsidies.
As they are clearly linked to the current volume of production and global world price,
they are Amber Box subsidies. Furthermore, 90 % of the cotton produced in the US
is under protection under the "US Crop Revenue and lnsurance Programme", which
covers farmers against potential losses of yield due to harsh weather conditions and
other natural phenomena. As they subsequently reduce the risk of farming, they are
technically Amber Box subsidies. However, because they are not product specific,
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meaning that they are also applied towards other crops, they have been
"permissible, as long as they do not exceed the de minimis quota" (ibid., p.16).
Finally, the last and arguably most controversial measure granted the
currently pending dispute, early victory for Brazil and the developing West and
Central African cotton producing nations, and recent appeal by the US at the WTO is
the Step 2 subsidies. This subsidy, which was established first in the 1990 Farm Bill,
totaled more than 10.7 billion $ between 1995 - 20O2 and has risen to the center of
the international debate over adverse impact of US subsidies on developing nations
because it "keeps US export prices in line with low-cost competitors" (EWG and
Oxfam, 2OO2, p.15). More specifically, it provided 285 cotton exporters and millers
from 1995 to 2OO2 with 1 .68 billion dollars, as aggregated under Commodity
Certificates (EWG). As of now, the WTO Dispute Panel has ruled against the US,
agreeing with Brazil that the Step 2 program, as well as other export credit guarantee
programs that distort international trading patterns through export subsidies as illegal
and in violation of various Articles of the Agreement on Agriculture. As a matter of
fact, this ruling has been backed up recently by the Appellate Body, reducing any
possibility of overruling in the future in favor for the United States. Consequently, the
US currently has to present a proposal, not a timetable, by mid-Summer on how to
implement the ruling. (for more information, see WTO Ruling, www.wto.org)
9.3 Perverse Myth of Gofton Subsidies
As becomes apparent, he cotton sector is one of the most heavily subsidized
sectors in the whole world, backed up by political lobbying roups, such as the
National Cotton Council of America, which portrays "an image of a sector dominated
by farmers operating in a harsh environment, but displaying an entrepreneurial drive
that benefits the nation" (Oxfam, 2002, p.24\. As a matter of fact, revisiting the earlier
cross-comparison of subsidies received per acre, it is fair to conclude that the cotton
sector and its political representatives are very well 'in-sync' and are able to produce
some of the most outrageous pork-barrels in the US Congress in a sector that is
highly non-efficient and cost-expensive. (See Graph 3) This lack of comparative
advantage becomes especially apparent when compared with the net cost of
producing one pound of cotton within the West African region. As seen in the graph,
Benin, with 30 cents per pound, averaging similar net cost as Mali can produce at
less than half of the average production cost of the United States with over 68 cents
per pound between 1999 and 2001.
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This earlier claim of uneven subsidies distribution is backed up by the data
provided for by the EWG, which shows that from 1995 to 2002, the top 10 7" of
cotton subsidy recipients received 78 o/o ol cotton subsidies (EWG). As a matter of
fact, large powerful agriculturalfarming corporations with intimate connections to
multi-national gro companies have received the vast bulk of the cotton subsidies
payments. For example, Tyler Farms in Arkansas, which controls almost 40'000
acres of land, has received a total of almost 25 million cotton subsidies from 1995 -
2002 (ibid.). In 2001 alone, the company received almost $6 million in cotton
subsidies, a figure which is equivalent o the average income of 25'000 people in
Mali (Oxfam, 2002, p.24).
The paradox of the situation is further aggregated by the fact that the
recipients for these subsidies are not the local, rural cotton farmer, as argued in the
most prevalent discourse on agricultural subsidies.lT As a matter of fact, the strong
trend towards the consolidation of the family farm into large-scale concentrated
farming is aggravated by the subsidies which provide sufficient capital to large-scale
producers yet exclude almost completely the bottom 80 "/" of farmers, who receive 8
per cent of the payments, a total of 5470$ per recipient. Consequently, while
President Bush promoted the myth that the current subsidies "promote tarmer
independence, and preserve the farm way of life [and] helps America's farmers, and
therefore it helps America," it becomes clear that the present agricultural policies
most importantly help to preserve the increasing marginalization of smaller scale
farmers on a domestic and global scale (ibid., p.1).
17 This creation of the myth of the family farm has been documented as early as in 1981 by
lngolf Vogeler in his book "The Myth of the Family Farm:Agribusiness Dominance of US
Agriculture".
From a legal standpoint, up to this date, we will have to wait and see what the
final ruling of the WTO will be. However, it becomes already apparent that any
reduction either through the Dispute Settlement Mechanism or through the
Framework in Export Subsidies will have a greater effect on large-scale farmers that
have become dependent on sustaining their lack of 'comparative advantage'through
agricultural subsidies. ln terms of timing, however, it becomes very relevant through
which modus operandi the reduction will be achieved, as a final ruling against the US
would most likely accelerate any changes in US subsidies policies given the ability of
exporting markets to impose tariffs in retaliation.
Overall, it becomes apparent that the current unsustainable cotton subsidies
policy is largely founded upon the ill-advised vision of a rural America on "which we
can project our hopes and dreams" (Danbom , 1997 , p. 1 sff). As a matter of fact,
hoping to escape the cold reality of neo-liberalism and global capitalism, the return to
our'roots' and the agriculturalvillage often serves as our source of inspiration, hope
and energy. As long as current agricultural policies largely support he heavy-hitters
of cotton production, however, the likelihood is immense that we will end up facing
the stark reality of neo-liberalism within our own backyard soon and the 'family-farm'
we tried to preserve will have been reformed into a commodity without aesthetics
and feel of 'naturalness.'
9.4 US Maize Sector
This picture of the ruralfarmland held by the US population isheavily
dominated not by cotton, but by corn, which occupies the largest amount of farmed
area of any other crop. While cotton has received higher subsidies payments per
area, corn farmers have received the most amounts of subsidies in total. Estimates
of the 2003-2004 season show little change in acres planted, as they decreased by
0.2 million acres from 78.9 in 20O2-2003 to 78.7 in 2003-2004. However, in its most
recent USDA Corn Crop Production Report in November, the acres harvested broke
again all records, due to better production conditions as the acres harvested rose
from 69.3 to 71.1 millions. Gonsequently, the overall production of corn has reached
record heights, surpassing the 10 billion bushels barrier, as it increased by 12 %
from 8'967 mill ion bushels to 10'1 4 mill ion bushels in 2003-2004 (USDA and Hilker,
2005).
Granted this vast amount of production, over 1.4 million farmers,
corporations, partnerships and estates have become the beneficiaries of at least one
corn subsidy payments from 1995 - 2003 (EWG). However, analogous to cotton, B0
o/o of them received on average just'4700 dollars totalover 9 years, which, when
broken down, results in less than $50 per month. Consequently, in comparison, the
bottom 8O o/o of corn farmers received only 15 % of the payments, whereas the top 1
7o received 18 o/o. Thus, the number, while proportionally higher than the cotton
producers, issignificantly lower in terms of total payments (EWG). (See Graph 4)
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As can be seen, subsidy payments in the US greatly deviate from the gini
coefficient of 0. Consequently, it becomes obvious that for any further analysis of the
effects of a reduction of US corn and cotton subsidies, the effects are most likely to
have a small etfect on small scale farmers, as they are only benefiting marginally,
mostly through conservation programs, from this form of government support.
In terms of exports, the US is the world's largest exporter of maize globally
(Oxfam, 2004). However, as Arturo Warman documented in his book "Corn &
Capitalism: How a.Botanical Bastard Grew to Global Dominance" , it was not untilthe
early 1980s when corn surpassed the previously most important expofi, wheat, both
in terms of value and volume and became the "backbone" of the "international phase
of U.S. agriculture" (Warman, 2003, p.191f). As a matter of fact, present numbers
show that in the 2002 - 2003 production year, total US corn value amounted lo 21 .2
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US$ billion, which is almost four times more than the 5.9 US$ billion of wheat
production (NCGA, 2003).
The rise of corn to its supreme status has occurred synchronous with the rise
of large multinational gribusiness and the'Green'and Biotech' Revolutions. Holding
the highest value of production, the corn sector is largely dominated by large
agribusinesses, such as Cargill, Monsanto, Dow and Archer Daniels Midland.
Monsanto alone has acquired more than 22 seed companies from 1995 - 1998
(MacDonald and Denbaly, 2000).
These firms have undertaken a policy of mergers over the past years, which
have become even more important as with the introduction of GM corn, an
increasing vertical oligopoly exists. Consequently, as seed companies and research
firms have been acquired by these mega agribusinesses, so have the pesticide and
fertilizer markets become increasingly consolidated. The top four firms'concentration
ratios account for 64 % of seeds sold. These companies are DuPont/Pioneer,
Monsanto, Novartis and Dow. These numbers are also retlected in the fact that
presently the US is the largest grower of genetically modified (GM) crops, accounting
for as much as 68 % of the world's GM production areas (ISAAA, 2003). In 2003, Bt
corn plantings have increased from its introduction i  1996 with 4 "/" to a total of 40
% (Whybiotech,2004).
Furthermore, within the cotton industry, Monsanto dominates this industry as
it accounts tor 87 7o of cotton seed sales, if included with Delta & Pine Land
(MacDonald, Denbaly and Mark, 2000). In terms of the processing chain, wet corn
milling powers are concentrated by 74 "/o in 1997, grown from 63 "h in 1977, within
ADM, Cargill, Staley and CPC. Cotton seed milling, on the other hand, while the data
is older, is owned with 62 % by Anderson Clayton (ibid.).
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Overall, 2OO1-2OO2 global corn exports figures show that the US exports
accounted for more than 60 o/o,1847 million bushels or 2O "/" of total US maize
production, which is significantly more than the 4O "/"that the US accounts for in
world production. lt is within this context that the National Corn Growers Association,
one of the largest lobbying roups, warns that "without export markets ffor cornl,
farm and ranch income would be significantly lower today" (NCGA, 2OO4). While
arguing strongly in favor of USTR Zoellick's "ongoing efforts to promote free and fair
trade" that "assure US corn and corn products full access to world markets", they
have been highly skeptical of the post-Cancun developments (ibid.). As indicated in a
letter to USTR Robert Zoellick and Secretary of Agriculture Ann Veneman by 12 of
the most powerful agricultural lobbying roups, they each voiced " serious concerns
about developing countries'demand for limiting the implementation f new
disciplines on market access, domestic support, and export subsidies in any self-
declared eveloping country" ("Letter," NCGA, 2OO3). Consequently, while voicing
their appreciation for further agricultural liberalization, they are articulating their
concern with "extensions of Special and Differential treatment"ls for developing
nations, while arttully hiding their own practices behind green and blue boxes (ibid.).
The US subsidies tructure for corn closely resembles the cotton subsidies
explained earlier. Production Flexibility and Market Loss Assistance payments make
up the largest amounts of total subsidies. (See Table 2) While the former has been
declared a Green Box subsidy, the latter has been placed within the Amber box as
they exhibit a "direct link between payments and market prices" (Oxfam, 2OO4, p.7).
18 Their major concern here lies with the recent "precautionary approach" principle which is
applied in the disputes on GM crops. The US corn growers are essentially worried about the
abuse of the "health and safety" clause in the WTO agreements, which would allow for
restrictions of market access. etc.
Furthermore, loan deficiency payments, which account for the third largest form of
subsidies, are classified as 'amber box'. Consequently, over the period from 1995 -
2002, approximately 44 % of the subsidies fell within the green box, while 56 % in
the amber box. (See Graph 5)
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g.s The Cofron Sector of Mali:
The West African nation of Mali has situated itself at the center of the current
WTO cotton dispute and has taken great strides in the past and present in providing
for a state-centered approach which placed a lot of faith into the'white gold', cotton.
As a matter of fact, the developmental discourse in Mali continuously stressed that
"'coton est la cl6 du d6veloppement [cotton is the key to development]" (Jeune
Afrique Economie qtd. in Keeley and Scoones, 2004). Consequently, under the
leadership of Prime Minister Alpah Oumar Konare, cotton, with its high
socioeconomic status attached to it, has historically received a vast amount of
political and research attention and domestic financial support, hrough which Mali
has surpassed allother sub-Saharan African nations in terms of production output
and is currently the largest cotton producer and exporter in SSA.
It is within this context of the promise for development of cotton that I will
evaluate the current WTO agreement and its impact on Mali later on. Consequently, I
willfirst provide a historical account of the two major stages of French colonialism
and independence inorder to illustrate the past activities, efforts and hopes that have
led to what is believed to be a "rare agricultural success stories in contemporary
Africa" (Bassett, 2001). Second, this analysis will be followed by recent
developments of liberalization, as emphasized by outside pressures from the WB
and lMF. Finally, I will provide for an analysis of the present cotton sector and its
intriguing factors that need to be taken into account when evaluating the WTO
Cotton Dispute Settlement and the Framework agreement.
Mali has long held a leading role in producing high quality cotton for the
global export market due to favorable climatic conditions and less mechanical picking
methods. While it does still trail heavily subsidized Greece in terms of export
quantities, 2OO3|2OO4 estimates and 200412005 forecasts how that Mali is close to
reaching the spot of the 4th largest cotton exporter in the world. (See Table 3)
Thus, using the 2OO3|20O4 seasons as a benchmark, Mali's 256'000 metric
tons (mt) account for 3.5 % of the global exports of 7'183'000 Mt. In terms of cotton
production, Mali currently is estimated of having approximately 545'000 ha under
production (average between 2003 - 2005). Furthermore, it holds one of the highest
yields in SSA with an average of 450 kg/ha of cotton produced. Analyzed from an
African perspective, Mali is the largest cotton producer, with 1.2 million bales
produced in 2003/2004, which is closely followed by Burkina Faso and Egypt
(FAOSTATS).
Analyzing the cotton market on a domestic scale, 2O04|2OOS figures show
that Mali is likely to hold a greater end stock than it did in the beginning, as
te The reason for the drop in 2OOO|2OO1, as explained later on, was a very'effective'farming
strike in Malito gain greater share in producer prices.
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Exports: 1000 Metric
Tons
(USDA: World Cotton
Markets)
1 999
2000
20001
2oo1'n
2001t
2002
20021
2003
20031
2004
(Estimated)
20041
2005
(Projected)
United States 1470 1467 2395 2591 2996 2874
Uzbekistan 893 740 740 762 642 729
Australia 699 850 681 578 470 414
Greece 235 3 1 0 218 250 267 250
Mali 196 125 201 185 256 223
Table 3
Source: USDA
production of 1.O7 million 480 pound bales outstrips its exports, which total 1.025
million 480 pound bales. Thus, while its beginning stock was 257'0OO 480 pound
bales, its end stock is projected to be 282'000 480 pound bales. While this is
indicative of a weakening demand on a global scale, it also is important to note that
domestic onsumption (use) is proportionally outperformed by exports by a 1:51 ratio
(20:1025 1'000 480 lb Bales). Thus overall, Mali has approximately 61'000 metric
tons of cotton left at the end of the 2OO4|2OO5 cycle, a growth of about 8.5 % from
the beginning stock, which is considerably more than the 1'000 metric tons increase
in the 200312004 production year ("Cotton," USDA,2AA4\.
These recent data are part of the continuing complex story of the fast rise of
cotton in the West African ations under French colonial rule. Starting in 1960, cotton
production i  the West and Central African nations under the CFA franc zone did not
amount o more than 1 % of total world production (Tefft, 2003, p.3). Consequently,
as France was increasingly becoming interested in establishing cotton as the basis
for its economic surplus extraction in a post WWI environment, motivated by
Sarraut's policy of 'la mise en valeur des colonies francaises', they introduced a
system usually referred to as'filiere'. As described by Keeley, J. and Scoones, 1., this
vertically-styled organization "entails a very tightly integrated and managed system
covering all aspects of the life of cotton - from provision and choice of inputs, to
guidance in crop management, tosupply of credit, to purchase and marketing of
outputs, to processing and export" (2OO4, p.102).
With the introduction of new cotton hybrid varieties, output increased
dramatically (see graph 1) in the 1970s and 1980s, and this focus on cotton
production as the 'key towards development'enjoyed a linear continuation even in a
post-colonial era through the continued "work of a quasi-privatized parastatal, the
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Compagnie Malienne pour le Developpement des Textiles (CMDT), that has
monopoly control over the local market" (Moseley qtd. in Moseley and Logan,2OO3,
p.54). lt is important to note however that compared to other countries in the West
and CentralAfrican region, the creation of a state cotton companies occurred fairly
late (Tetft, 2003, p.8). As a matter of fact, prior to the creation of the CMDT, Mali
experienced a drastic increase in cotton yields, which grew between 1960 and 1974
at an "annual rate ol15/o, tripling average yields to 833 kilograms per hectare. The
area under cotton cultivation expanded at an annual 5.5 % rate over the period
reaching 69'000 hectares in 1974" (ibid., p.12).
The CMDT, as the otfspring from the cotton filiere after independence in
1974, was partially owned by the Malian state, 60 o/o, and 40 o/o w€ra held by the
Compagnie Francaise pour le Developpement des Fibres Textiles (CFDT), of which
64 % is owned by the French government, and constitutes one of the world's top ten
largest international cotton merchants (Keeley and Scoones, 2004, p.103).
Consequently, this highly vertically-integrated cotton operation acts not only as a
'commercial company'in that it provides cotton farmers with credits, seeds and
technology to produce cotton which it then resells on the international market, but it
also holds a mandate as a "rural development agency", as CMDT has taken the
leading role in providing for "social development inthe Mali-Sud region", which goes
well beyond "the provision of health centers and literacy training, to the provision of
infrastructure, such as roads, and some commitment to environmental management"
(ibid., p.103). lt is within this system of the holistic, all-encompassing parastatal, still
largely controlled by its former colonial power, that the political clout of the CMDT
needs to be understood.
The increasingly political importance of the CMDT however did not go
unchecked. One of the most important developments during the post-1974 period
under the CMDT were the successive farmer protests and their increasing ability in
mitigating untair and pressing for fairer production conditions, most importantly
higher production prices paid to the farmers. The first such widespread protest was
triggered in 1964 when farmers protested to what was perceived to be "dishonest
cotton grading and weighing practices" (Bingen et al., qtd. in Tefft, 2003, p.14).
Finally having their demands met, they created so called farmer organizations,
associations villageoises (AV), which were responsible in the "assembly and
weighing of seed cotton grading in villages" (Tefft, 2003, p.14').Furthermore, they
overall achieved lower CMDT operating costs and higher credit recovery rates as the
AVs gained controlover localdevelopment, such as the creation of infrastructures,
e.g. schools, health centers, wells (ibid.). They literally sprouted across the cotton
producing zone in Mali, starting with a single AV in 1974 to more than 900 by 1987.
Presently, there are over 4'500 AVs in the cotton producing zone (ibid., p.14).
The second large-scale political protest by cotton producers took place in
1991 , when the cotton farmers declared a cotton strike as the CMDT was unwilling to
meet their "grievances related to specific otton pricing and marketing practices" in
the aftermath of the overthrow of President Moussa Traora (ibid., p.14). As Jim
Bingen has argued, this "rural revolt symbolized a new era of 'democracy in the
countryside', and brought forth a vital new political actor (the Union of Cotton and
Food Crop Producers, Syndicat des producteurs de coton de vivriers, SYCOV) in
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Malian politics" (Bingen, democracy (have to find article again), p.1)This SYCOV,
representing local cotton farmers, consequently inthe end of 1991 became a major
new actor and has become a party to all "relevant CMDT decision-making units"
(Bingen et al, qtd. in Tefft, p.15).
Under this leadership of the SYCOV in cooperation with the CFDT, CMDT
and the World Bank/lMF, the farmers endured another major policy shift in 1994 with
the devaluation of the CFA franc by 5O o/o, surpassing the previously fixed exchange
rate of 50:1. This devaluation was largely pushed through in order to "reducing the
heavy dependence of the West Africa fanc zone on imports, stimulating export
production and import substitution and shifting consumer demand towards more
locally produced goods and services. The ultimate goalwas to stimulate self-
sustaining, broad-based economic growth, which would reduce Mali's widespread
poverty and food insecurity" (Dibley qtd. in Tetft, 2003, p.23). This issue was even
the more pressing as donors increasingly placed conditions on their financial
assistance, as the cotton sector had acquired a 9 billion CFAF deficit by 1985/1986.
This scenario was repeated again in 1992, when due to the fall in world prices and
the previous overvaluation of the CFA franc, the CMDT needed financial support
from the "Malian and French governments, the European Union and World Bank to
cover their losses" (Bocchino qtd. in Tefft, 2003, p.21-22).
Initially, after the devaluation in 1994 and a parallel rise in world cotton prices,
the impact on Mali's cotton sector was felt "overnight", resulting in a nominal rise of
189 % in the CFA price of fiber (Tefft, 2003, p.23). However, even though the CMDT
saw a net raise in the sales price of 463 CFA franc per kilogram, under the producer
price fixing system, the farmers only received 30 CFAF per kg. lt was not until the
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next year that the nominal base producer price of seed cotton was raised by 65 %
from 85 to 140 CFA franc, these higher levels "spurred large increases in the
production of seed cotton and in the quantity of coilon ginned. Between 1994 and
1998, production grew annually by 21 o/o", pushing the francophone CFA countries'
world market share from 8.8 "/"in 1991192 to 15 % in 1997/98 (ibid., p.23-24).
Contrary to earlier expansions, however, this expansion largely was
undertaken on the'back of nature', as the acreage of planted cotton increased
annually by 7.6 7" between 1994 - 1998, resulting in an overall increase of 45 % in
total area cultivated. As CMDT data shows, the average cotton farm planted 2.4 to
seed cotton and 4.4 hectares to cereals with a total area of I hectares (CMDT qtd. in
Tefft, 2003, p.241. lt has consequently been argued that the initial result of the
devaluation has been vast expanses in extensification of cotton production, as "most
farmers increased acreage cultivated by reducing fallow periods and clearing new
lands" (Tefft, 2003, p.24l.This extensification largely went hand in hand with a vast
increase in the use of animal traction equipment, as reflected in the fact that "manual
or non-equipped farms declined by 23 7o" from 1994 - 1998 (CMDT qtd. in Tetft,
p.24). This increase in the numbers of cotton producers extended long past the 1993
devaluation i to the present, as by 1998, 93 % of farm household in the CMDT zone
were growing cotton and by the 2000, amounted to over 200'000, a 5O "/" increase
since 1993 (Teffi, 2003, p.25). Alongside four more cotton gins were constructed,
raising the total to 17.
However, as pointed out by Moseley, this increase in production has greatly
increased the pressure that cotton has placed on the environment. As a matter of
fact, the preference placed by the government and the CMDT on "expanding
production i  new areas rather than seek sustainable alternatives inolder production
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zones" has resulted in increased soilerosion, pesticide and nutrient runoff (Moseley,
2004, p.55). Thus, farmers during the post-1993 period have increasingly
experienced eclining yields in the old cotton basin, and the blame has solidly been
placed by the World Bank, the CMDT and other governmental officials on the poor
farmers, and as represented in the international discourse of the "poverty-induced
environmentaldegradation thesis" (ibid., p.55). However, as his research has
indicated, the "relatively rich, rather than the relatively poor, are the proximate cause
of environmental degradation in southern Mali" (ibid., p.57). As a matter of fact, the
poorer members of rural communities, seeking to gain profits generated from the rise
in cotton profits, are seriously lagging behind in their richer counterparts, largely due
to lack of capital investments and agricultural knowledge, in their ability "to practice
resource exploitation on the same scale" (ibid., p.57).
Another indicator of the increasing environmental unsustainability of cotton
production has been the fact that previous advantages, as indicated by the signs of
relatively lower crop loss rates of 20 to 35 % compared to 60 % in other African
nation, is slowly eroding. As a matter of fact, growing resistance has often been
named on the main reasons for the decrease in seed cotton yields, as pesticide
quantity used has doubled (Tefft, 2003, p.27).ln 1995, for example, "cotton bollworm
resistance to the relatively non-toxic pyrethroids became problematic and was
compounded by additional damage from whiteflies" (Bingen qtd. in Moseley and
Logan, 2003). Consequently, at present it is generally perceived that Malian farmers,
under the leadership of the CMDT, have largely entered the'classic pesticide
treadmill' response, as opposed to undertaking a more organic approach, such as
formulated under the very successful integrated pest management plans (lPMs).
Because of the fact that CMDT has been an the largest employer and
provided numerous well-paid jobs, the CMDT has increasingly become the target of
corruption and patronage, as high-level officials kimmed off security funds for
themselves and their political allies personal protits. Consequently, Mali has recently
been shaken with corruption charges in 1999, as "three vice-presidents of the CMDT
were removed for corruption", close links exist between the ruling party and senior
officials, as well as the more than 2000 officials of the CMDT have received
substantially higher benefits and wages than any other state employees (ibid.,
p.10a). This has led to drastic hanges to the cotton sub-sector as demands have
increased for restructuring and privatizing the CMDT and "reassigning [the role of the
statel in the public and private sector and [...] remodeling its producer support
system" (Zoundi, 2OO4). This reform has been adopted on 6rh of June 2001,
amended in 2003 by the government and is to be carried out until 2006.
These reform calls have essentially been further strengthened by the very
strong cotton boycott in 2000/01 season, when a large number of cotton farmers
refused to plant their annual cotton, "resulting in a 47 % tall in seed cotton
production" and a subsequent loss of at least 20 billion CFA francs in potential
revenues (Tetft, 2003, p.35). The motivation for the strike was the fact that the
farmers'AVs were severely financially strained when the CMDT decided to reneged
on its earlier agreement of 195 CFAF/kg and paid farmers only 155 CFAF/kg (ibid.,
p.34). Furthermore, besides these price constraints, reports of the 'disappearance'of
36 million US dollars that had been established at the CMDT did not help its cause
for institutional survival either.
Realizing that the cotton sector was "no longer serving as a dynamic motor
for economic development in rural Mali", these reforms call for a restructuring of the
CMDT (ibid., p.39). This restructuring effort includes uch measures as "refocusing
CMDT towards public service missions; withdrawal from extension work; gradual
withdrawalfrom input and equipment supply activities; continued withdrawal of
CMDT from transport activities; more rational use of human resources" (Zoundi,
2004). Furthermore, these liberalization efforts of the cotton and oil seeds sub-sector
also callfor a "better participation by producers in managing the cotton sub-sector,
which includes allowing them to buy into CMDT capital and greater control by
producers in providing services that they need" (ibid.). Most importantly CMDT's
refocus towards public services has already resulted in the reduction of its work force
by almost 600 employees, as well as extension services have "dropped from approx.
1000 to a bare 500, which means 1 agent for 450-500 farms, rather than 250 - 300
farms" (ibid., p.6).
9.6 Maize Sector in Mali
Consequently, while cotton in Mali has to some extent lost its dominant
stance within the development discourse, maize production has received
increasingly more attention as a crop used for the internal market and neighboring
countries' trade.20 Introduced in Mali in the 1970s by French-operated research
stations in West Atrica, maize has historically played a minor role in Mali (MSU
lnternational Development Working Papers, 1994, p.6f). However, as a reaction to
"chronic food deficits during the 1970s and early 1980s, government policy has
consistently stressed self-sufficiency in cereals as a policy objective" (ibid., p.18).
Consequently, using the synergies that exist with the already existing linkage and
a Export ligures lor maize are negligible as maize is largely consumed either fresh or
marketed towards the urban population.
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integrated approach towards technological delivery of the CMDT, maize farming was
launched as a crop alternative to reduce starvation. As the CMDT decided to
promote more intensive maize production, applying improved maize varieties and
increased usage of fertilizer, maize production grew dramatically. As seen in the
following Graph 7, improved maize was adopted very rapidly over the period from
1975 - 1990. As established by MSU researchers, this increase in the adoption of
maize was highly correlated2l with increased mechanization of expanded cotton
production. As cotton farmers invested their profits into mechanization equipment,
they increasingly were able to "plow and weed frequently in a timely manner" (ibid.,
p.2O').Furthermore, th y also were able to apply left-over fertilizer f om the previous
cotton year to maize production, as maize "is the most fertilizer-responsive rained
cereal" (ibid., p.20).
In addition, foreign donors were increasingly eager to support maize
production as an alternative to cotton and rice. For example, a francophone
development project, Proiect Marg established an "operational budget for a seed
multiplication farm, a large-scale program of maize demonstrations, a program of
first-equipment loans for non-mechanized farmers, and the construction of maize
storage silos at CMDT regionaldepots" (ibid., p.21). However, two main setbacks
occurred, when in 1983 a maize streak virus outbreak destroyed hundreds of
hectares of maize and subsequently in 1986 when the CMDT was no longer able to
financially sustain its integrated approach towards production of maize, as it had to
remove guaranteed prices for maize (ibid., p.20-22). Being exposed to these market
21 Their findings are that "bivariate correlations between the area of improved maize and the
number of draft animals and equipment in service over the period 1975 - 1909 gives the
following results (all significant at the 0.01 level): number of draft oxen 0.98; number of plows
0.99 ; number of weeders 0.98; number of seeders 0.98" (p.20)
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pressures, farmers adapted rather quickly by reducing chemical fertilizer input,
changing seed varieties and increasingly applying traditional maize-millet
intercropping methods (ibid., p.22).
These findings reaching up to 1990 are greatly supported by James Tefft's
work published in late 2003. As he points out, "contrary to a popular perception that
cash crops have a negative ffect on food crop production and household food
security, cotton production has proven to be a boom to coarse gain production in
Mali" (2004, p.17). As a matter of fact, he found that average annual gross cereal
production per capita between 1989/90 - 1997198 was in general almost wice as
high in CMDT production zones as opposed to the overall region.22 As regression
analysis by Dione in 1989 has shown , "a 10 7o increase in per capita cotton area was
associated with a '12 oh to 13 7" increase in net coarse grain availability per capita"
(Dione qtd. in Teftt, 2004, p.17). Consequently, the earlier documented growth in
cotton production has brought with itself a3.5"/" annual increase in maize production
between 1960 and 1985. Furthermore the total area that was planted in the CMDT
zone rose from 6000 hectares to 51000 hectares from 1960 to 1985 (Tefft, 2004,
p.18). With the resent higher farm-level prices, cereal production, analogous to
cotton, has increased rastically in area as extensification has taken place as a
response to devaluation. Figures how that the total average cereal area planted in
ha grew from 3.4 to 4.4 between 1993/94 and 1997/98, accounting for a29 "/"
change overall (ibid., p.24). This process was further aided by increased
mechanization, asseen in the earlier high correlations, leading in increased, while
2 To use an example, in the Koulikoro/Fana region, production per capita (kg per person)
averaged at225, as opposed to the CMDT zone with 407 kg per person.
stillvolatile, maize production starting dramatically inthe 1980s. (See Graph 7)
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Furthermore, the data greatly supports Tefft's earlier claim of increased
extensive production after devaluation i 1994, as production and area under
production measured in ha increased from 256952 hectares in 1993 prior to
devaluation to 619896 hectares in 1999, which is an increase of more lhan 24O "/".
(See Graph 8)
Overall, while not an export c;lrop er se, maize in Mali has become
increasingly important, especially since the "loose[ning] inthe mid-1980s [by the
CMDT]to allow farmers to freely manage the allocation [of] agricultural inputs across
different farm plots [...] Maize then became a maior cash crop" (Hussein, 2004).
Consequently, as maize has reached increasing importance, the described
interdependence b tween maize and cotton production is clearly a key factor that
needs to be taken into account when evaluating the potential impact of the WTO
agreements and the cotton trade dispute settlement. (See Graph 9).
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9.7 Maize and Cotton Sectors in South Africa
Historically, European settlers and their colonial regimes have forcefully
supported the development ofcorn in order to meet the urban demand for export
products and for export use. ln many colonies, as a matter of fact, corn cultivation
was the only "alternative if [the settlers] were to remain in the African colonies at all"
(Warman, 2003, p.72).lt is within this context that South Africa, under the modelof
Apartheid, rose to become the "leading producer of corn in Africa [...] accounting for
about a third of total production" (ibid., p.87). Consequently, during the period of the
Green Revolution, only Zimbabwe and South Africa were essential exporters of corn
in the Sub-Saharan setting.
Placed within the current context, South Africa presents an interesting case,
as it is clearly more developed than Mali, yet still 'underdeveloped'when interpreted
from a US perspective. Consequently, South Africa has often been classified as a
developing nation with great amounts of potential in Africa since the ending of
Apartheid rule in 1994. In terms of agricultural production, South Africa acts in two
interesting almost as a mirror image to Mali's agriculturalsector. First, on a macro-
scale, while the agricultural sector as opposed to Mali and similar to the US, only
accounts for approximately 14 "h of its GDP and 10 % of its export goods, it still
provides employment and a backbone of people's livelihoods for more than 7 million
people. As stated in the "Strategic Plan for South African Agriculture", the
approximately 50'000 large-scale commercialfarmers in South Africa, which are
predominantly white, "employ about 1 million workers, which is 11 % of total formal
sector employment inthe country''(NDA, 2001). These employees then provide
livelihoods and housing to more than 6 million family members. Furthermore, with the
rise of 24O'OOO small-scale farmers, an additional one million family members, and
500000 temporalworkers also need to be included into the calculations (ibid.).
Overall, taking into account the "increasingly popular and economically significant
agro-tourism and gameJarming activities [...] about 40 o/o of the country's total
population are therefore dependent mainly on agriculture and related industries"
( ib id.) .
However, it is important to note that while the importance of farming is still
relevant, a merging of tarms and increased concentration of farmland has occurred
similar to the United States. According to the most recent2002 South African
Census of Agriculture, the number of active commercial tarm units decreased by
12162 compared to the 1993 census to 45818 active commercialfarmers (Statistics
SA, 2004, p.1). Furthermore, the number of employees in {ormal agriculture also
decreased by almost 14 o/o to below a million with 940'815 employees, ofwhich
Western Cape employed the largest number of paid employees (ibid.).
Secondly, South Africa stands out from Mali, as maize, as opposed to cotton
is its largest export crop, amounting to 749'870 metric tons being exported in 2O02,
with a totaf value of more than 135 million US$ (FAOSTATS). Using 2O01-2002 data,
South Africa exported 47 million bushels of maize, which accounts tor 2"h of global
maize exports, a small fraction when compared to the 1 .8 billion bushels exported in
the US. f n terms of overall corn production of 358 million bushels in 2OO1l2OO2, this
export sum accounts for a mere 13 "/" of total production (USDA (2), 2A04\. Au
contraire to the situation in Mali, cotton on the other hand is not an export crop, as
the average export for cotton lint production between 1994/95 to 200312004 amounts
to only 1850 metric tons total, with no exports occurring and projected from 2OO1l02
titl2004/05 (CottonSA.org). However, while maize production has historically
dominated the agricultural sector, cotton production isnot negligible in certain
regions. Cotton presently accounts for approximately 1 o/o of total South African
ag ricultu ral production, "generating approximately US$50 million ann ually" (Kock,
2000, as quoted in Shankar and Thirtle, p. 3). Furthermore, while 1530 large
commercialfarmers in the Limpopo Province, the Free State and KwaZulu-Natal
produce over 90 % of the output, smallholder farming is still significant in certain
regions. For example, about 3000 Zulu smallholders inthe Makhathini Flats,
KwaZulu-Natal, nd 500 in Tonga, Mpumalanga, produce an aggregated 98 % of
smallholder cotton grown in South Africa (Hofs and Kirsten, 2002, as quoted in
Shankar and Thirtle, p.4).
As the government, with the institution of the GMO Act of 1997 has adopted a
policy unique to the whole SSA, which is in favor of the adaptation of genetically
modified agriculture, both GM maize and cotton23 have been introduced in South
Africa since then. Presently, more than 600 different biotechnology projects are
believed to be in existence, with more than 50 companies2o, Monsanto having its
Africa headquarters inSouth Africa, involved (Ledermann, 2003). As a matter of fact,
as stressed by the government, GM technology plays an integral part as it "provides
us with a way of meeting the growing demand of food without placing even greater
pressure on our scarce resources. lt allows us to grow better-quality crops with
a Bt cotton is also planned for introduction in Mali, as a recent news report by GRAIN has
discussed. As a matter of tact, researchers with the Institut d'Economie Rurale in Mali are
currently in the process of finalizing a five-year plan with the USAID, Monsanto, Syngenta
and Dow Agrosciences to develop and commercialize GM cotton.
24 lt is important to note that while many of these companies provide research, competition
between them has reportedly increased. As an example, while a private input supply
company, VUNISA, was in charge of supplying smallholders in Makhathini Flats with Bt
cotton by Monsanto, their monopoly status has been undermined most recently. As a matter
of tact, while VUN|SA "buys cotton trom the farmers at prices fixed by Cotton South Africa, [it]
now has to compete with Danish-owned NSK, which has opened a high-capacity cotton gin"
(Shankar and Thirtle, p.4).
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higher yields while at the same time sustaining and protecting the environment"
(Dept. of Agriculture SA, as quoted in Ledermann, 2003). Presently, approximately
already between 10 and 15 o/o ol maize crop planted is genetically manipulated in
order to protect it trom the 'stalk borer' (Reynolds 2002, as quoted in Ledermann,
2003). Furthermore, Bf-cotton production has been introduced in 1999, showing
'strong' results in the Makhathini Flats area of KwaZulu-Natal, s95 7" of small-scale
farmers have been estimated to be growing GM cotton by 20O112002 in that specific
region with "augmentling] their gross margin by 11 o/" in the first season , and 77 "h in
the second season in comparison to farmers growing non-Bf cotton" (Nuffield Council
on Bioethics, 2003, p.23, as quoted in Ledermann, 2003).
While these results give hope for the application of Bt cotton as a tool for
poverty reduction, Aaron de Grassi has pointed out that improved cotton technology
seems unfit to reduce poverty, as a host of other factors are largely contributing
towards it. Just to name a few, he identifies the unequaldistribution of power in
terms of negotiating access to water, "top-down planning favoring wealthier farmers,
elitist ourism, authoritarian nature conservation, land inequality compounded by slow
land reform, declining pensions and off-farm wages, overproduction a d HIV/AlDS"
(de Grassi, 2OO3, p.38 as quoted in Ledermann, 2003). From another point of view,
as a recent investigation by Shankar and Thirtle into the situation in KwaZulu-Natal
argue, the main contribution of the introduction of Bt technology isto enable "the
smallholders to circumvent credit and labor constraints associated with pesticide
application" (Shankar and Thirtle, 2004, p.1). Consequently they show that "non-BT
smallholders in South Africa under-use pesticide and that the main contribution of the
new technology is to enable them to realize the lost productivity resulting from under-
use" (ibid.).
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Nevertheless, two recent reports of development projects heavily focus on
cotton as a toolto lift small-scale, black farmers out of poverty. As reported in July
2004, a R150 million investment project in Eastern cape is hoped to provide for a
much needed boost o "South Africa's truggling cotton sector" (SouthAfrica.info,
"R150m. . :", 2OO4). Being one of the poorest province in South Africa, it is hoped that
this investment, undertaken by the East London-based textile manufacturer Da
GamaTextiles, will"create some 6000 seasonaljobs and empower localblack
farmers" (ibid). Overall, the project forms an integral part of a widespread cotton
industry's development s rategy "which looks to draw emerging black farmers into
cotton growing", as almost 1500 ha of cotton will be planted, which should produce
36000 bales within the next three years (ibid.). ln addition, the Labour Job Creation
Trust, an agglomerate of three South African trade unions, has created the Moutse
Cotton Umbrella in Denilton, Mpumalanga. This project is intended to provide money
to buy farming equipment in order for 130 women farmers to enter the cotton
businesses (SouthAf rica.info, "Cotton. . ", 2OO4).
In terms of research, the University of Missouri has been instrumental, in a
similar fashion to Michigan State University in Mali, in providing its expertise in
creating a modeling system to analyze the complex economic interrelationships of
food and agriculture industry to the University of Pretoria (FAPRI, p.1). With the fall
of apartheid, legislation "eliminated a large number of parastatal marketing boards on
products ranging from sugar to maize" (ibid., p.4). At present, he main control is held
by cooperatives and producer associations, "putting South Africa with countries like
New Zealand and Australia" in terms of their elimination of "nearly all direct subsides"
(ibid., p.4). Subsequently, it is argued that with the increasing exposure of South
African agriculture tothe volatile fluctuations inworld market prices, their FAPRI
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model provides them with the necessary forecasting tool to provide for the
strengthening of the primary sector, but also the increasing integration of formerly
marginalized small- and medium-scale black farmers within the competitive global
market (ibid., p.4ff). Basing their projections on macro economic variables of the
exchange rate, population, income per capita and inflation, they have created the
following baseline projections for maize production i  South Africa (million tons). (see
Graph 10)
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Most importantly, this graph shows an increase in production and a
consequent increase in exports, as domestic onsumption is reduced given the
projected population decrease in South Africa from 45.1 millions to 42.9 million
between 2O04 and 2010.25 This decrease in consumption is also suppoded by
increasing inflation versus the dollar, which will cause higher prices and resulting in
more maize being exported. Overallthough, this graph needs to be interpreted with
care, as it does not predict the future.26.
Overall, while cotton holds a potential to be evaluated for farmers as an
alternate source of income, the importance of maize as the dominant staple food in
South Africa is well-established. Classified as a "wage good", it takes up as much as
20 o/o ol a low-income consumer's income, and any changes in supply and
subsequent lower prices could have a great effect on their livelihoods and food
security (Traub and Jayne, 2004, p. 1). However, presently, the earlier mentioned
significant market reforms and liberalization of the agricultural sector have not yet led
to lower prices "as maize marketing and processing costs typically account for 50 to
70"/"ol the total cost of maize mealpaid by south Africa consumers" (ibid., p.1).
Consequently, while freer global markets might strengthen South Africa's stance as a
corn exporter, the domestic consumer and producer might profit little. As a matter of
fact, as lbng as South Africa's millers and processing firms control such a substantial
part of the commodity chain both in terms of percentage of profits and production,
they hofd a de facto oligopoly on the maize consumer and producer. While food
market reforms in neighboring countries have generally "reduced the marketing cost
5 For more projection information and detailed interpretation of the model please refer to the
Final Report for the University of Missouri South African Education Program, FAPRI.6 This point on the validity of the graph is especially important. As stressed by FApRl, it is
important o note that "in reality, the assumptions underlying the baseline are certain to be
violated, and so actual market outcomes will deviate from the projections presented in the
supply-and-use tables. Therefore, the usefulness of the baseline projections ls not to predict
the future but rather to analyze the impact of a range of "what if" questions on the baseline
projections" (FAPRl, p.1 0).
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wedge between producer and consumer prices, there are a priorireasons why this
outcome might not be expected in South Africa" (ibid., p.4). Nurtured over several
decades of colonialism, the maize industry holds considerate political cloud and
market control, as "three of the recently privatized grain cooperatives, Sentraalwes
(SWK), OTK , and NWK own72"/o of all silos in the country" (ibid., p.4).
Furthermore, two food-retailers, Pick 'n Pay and Shoprite Checkers hold a de facto
oligopoly in the retail sector, as they control 80 % of allfood retail sales (ibid., p.a).
Furthermore, certain companies are vertically integrated, meaning that they control
both silos, millings, processing and retailing.
In conclusion, it becomes clear that in order to evaluate the impact of the
WTO breakthrough, a potential increase of the world price of cotton and maize and
its impact on South African farmers, one needs to adopt a system's approach that
takes into account the whole spectrum of political, economic, social and
environmental concerns on the local. national and international level in order to
undertake a useful assessment of its potential impact.
10. Assessing the lmpacts
Having studied the contents of the WTO Framework agreement and the
reactions and present and past trends within the maize and cotton industries of the
United States, Mali and South Africa, this section is dedicated towards placing these
contents within an informed context in order to undertake an educated analysis of
possible short- and longterm impacts of the agreement on small- and large-scale
farmers within these economies. This analysis, while by no means authoritative, will
be drawing largely upon a synthesis of various ources ranging from the economic to
the sociopolitical. Consequently, while exploring several avenues, the ultimate goal
of this chapter will be to provide not definite answers but to raise important questions
that will need to be taken into account when tackling the vagaries of the WTO
outcomes.
lmpact #1: US Reduction of Subsidies and its lmpacts on US
Farmers
Assessing the impact of the current Framework agreement, one first needs to
explore the distribution of present subsidies. While Mali is exempt as a LCD country
from any reduction and South Africa presently does not exceed Total AMS
measures, the greatest impact will be found within the United States. As illustrated
earlier in Graph 4, both corn and cotton subsidies distributions are marked by a very
uneven distribution as exemplitied by its high gini coefficient. lt becomes apparent
that in both cases of maize and cotton , 2O o/o of the largest arms receive more than
8O "/" of the subsidies. Consequently, any subsequent subsidies reduction within the
US setting would affect more vastly larger farms than small-scale farmers. As has
been shown earlier, 8O "/" of the corn farmers received less than $50 per month.
Thus, the reduction would certainly not have that great of an effect on approximately
1 million farmers.
This finding concerning smaller farmers however stands in stark contrast o
that of larger farmers, whose operations are dependent upon being able to produce
domestically and export competitively cotton and maize in the world market. Of
course, this first major impact is largely contingent upon the inability to undertake
tactics of legal technicalities, uch as boxshifting, as well as the longer time horizons
that have been drawn in terms of the agreements' implementation, starting around
the year 2012, and the upcoming modalities to be negotiated by the end of 2005 and
the upcoming Hong Kong summit. However, granted the limitations, the overall
tendency speaks clearly in favor of reducing subsidies in the long run. This trend is
supported by the recent announcement by President Bush to tackle farming as the
major sector in which budgetary cuts will be undertaken, through the implementation
of fiscal limits on subsidies' recipients, potentially decreasing the current rend of
increasing agricultural land values.27 Furthermore, it is also important to differentiate
between cotton and corn in terms of its current legal contentions. As of this writing,
cotton subsidies have undergone a vastly greater scrutiny, as they have been the
subjects of international contention in the WTO. Consequently, while the possibility
exists that corn subsidies wil l receive less scrutiny in the near future, cotton
subsidies wil l have to be reduced more quickly in order to comply with the WTO
ruling. Thus such programs, for example the Step 2 export subsidies, will have to be
eliminated in the shorter, medium-term or compensatory legal measures wil l be in
order.
Granted the reduction of both domestic, as well as export subsidies, cotton
and maize prices no longer will be able to be sustained at an artificially higher level.
Consequently, prices for the domestic farmer in the US will most likely drop across
the board and overall supplfs, due to reduced profit margins or even lack thereof,
would be greatly reduced. Taking the well-documented xample of cotton and using
the various economical models applied, this estimated rop in US cotton production
variesfrom 1.5 % (ODl, 2OO4) to 29.1 % (Sumner,2003). Taking the average of all
studies cited by the FAO Commodity and Trade Policy Research Working Paper
(2004), the average supply would be reduced by 11 .59 %. Expressed in prices, the
27 As William Moseley has pointed out, this recent domestic pressure on the agricultural
sector could be interpreted indirectly as diminishing the earlier gained victory of third world
countries at the WTO in relationship with their bargaining power.
a lt is important to note however that certain farm activities within the US is delinked from the
capitalist logic of profitmaking. As Arturo Warman points out, "there are cases in which large
corporations enter into agriculture specifically intending to lose money. This would be poor
business trategy from any point of view other than the intricate labyrinth of tax breaks.
Ronald Reagan, before he became president, boasted of not paying taxes on income thanks
to losses on his California ranch" (Warman, p.195). As a word of caution, I need to point out
however that I am unaware of any case studies which would specifically demonstrate this tax-
delinking from capitalist logic in cotton and maize farming enterprises.
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estimated price increases range from 2.8 "/" (Tokarick, 2003) to 29.7 % (ICAC,
2OO2), with an average of approximately 16 "/"2e (FAO, 2OO4l.
While the models' f igures are different, i t  does become prevalent that a
subsidy reduction would have an effect on American farmers. Consequently, with the
lowered prices, there would be a great push towards these farmers to improve their
production processes if  they would l ike to sustain their operations. Based upon
earlier dynamics of farming operations, they would either have to increase the quality
of the cotton or corn that is produced in order to reap a greater price, i.e. organic
cotton or corn, or the output would have to be stepped up, such that the quantity and
eff iciency would be greater, while potential ly sacrif icing the potential gains
associated with the production of higher grade cotton (A) or producing maize for the
organic market. While this interpretation might lead to the increasing concentration
of farming operations within larger, more efficient units, the picture seems to be less
common-sensical, as pointed out by Willis L. Peterson in his study "Are large farms
more efficient?". Undertaking a study of the Corn Belt revealed that "there is
evidence of diseconomies [of scale] as farm size increases" (Peterson, 1997, p.2tt\.
Consequently, with a reduction of subsidies, the US corn and cotton farming size and
population is most likely to be reduced, accelerating the current decline, without
necessarily effecting a reduction in actual farming acreage.
As a result, the cultural and environmental landscape of farming in the US is
most likely to change accordingly as subsidies will be reduced and total output
declines. With a reduction in farming population, the public as a whole wil l
€ These disparities between the various tudies can be best explained by the different key
assumptions implicitly situated within each model. Those key assumptions are estimates on
demand and supply elasticity, year upon which the simulation is based upon, and whether or
not market segmentation was assumed and cotton stocks were included. For more detailed
analysis, refer to the earlier mentioned FAO Trade Backgrounder No.1 on cotton.
increasingly become more disconnected from the agricultural discourse of the myth
of the 'small scale tarmer' as fewer farming operations will remain. However, this
effect is mitigated by the unrelenting fact that the US farmers constitute one of the
most powerful historical lobbying groups that are willing to battle any reduction in
production-effecting subsidies. NCC (National Cotton Council) Chairman, Woods
Eastland, warned in a reaction to the recent proposal of budget cuts within the
agricultural sector, that "any reduction or weakening of the safety net provided by the
2OO2 larm law will negatively impact the security of all Americans", framing it as
"equivalent to unilateral disarmament" within the international WTO context (NCC,
2005). Furthermore, the American Farm Bureau (AFBF) and a diverse group of
organizations, argued that budget cuts in agriculture "will put at risk the promising
environmental benefits of the bill, and the nutritional health of some of the poorest
populations in our country" (AFBF, 2005). Consequently, it becomes apparent that
greater pressure exists to remedy any reduction or limits on subsidies with other
compensatory measures3o. Returning to the 'colored' boxes scheme, one approach
for which great support for the farmers exists, would be to strengthen present
conservation programs, so called Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and
Conservation Security Program (CSP), which are Green Box subsidies and have
been well-established on a global scale without much controversy in such countries
as Switzerland under the notion of 'multi-functionality.'This concept of strengthening
the green box through boxshifting away from the amber box would allow for greener,
more sustainable production, as farmers are receiving money to either take land out
of cultivation (CRP) and to farm sustainable (CSP). Furthermore, as such support is
s One suggested measure is greater support for farmers and ranchers purchasing land, as
well as the removalof the death taxes. etc.
currently capped at a maximum amount, this would greatly favor the smaller farms
and consequently correspond with the general public's perception of 77"/" support for
subsidies to small farms, yet only 31 "h support for subsidizing large farming
businesses ( P I PA/Knowledge Networks, 200 4, p.22tt).
Consequently, the big winner in the United States of subsidies reduction
would ult imately appear to be the public, as formerly budgeted tax money wil l be
freed up. This view seems to be strengthened by the PIPA survey, as the public
becomes increasingly more aware, through the works of such NGOs as EWG, of the
myth of agricultural subsidies. This debate will especially become more heated as
discussions and publicity wil l increase during the Presidential budget proposal
negotiations. Ultimately, however, it becomes evident that any saved budgetary
money will most likely be lost within the budgetary battles and other pork created
within it.
lmpact #2: Spread of Global Agribusinesses
This potential reduction in US production will not only hit hard the farmers
who were put out of business, but as well global agribusinesses who earn their
greatest share of profits within the US farming industry. (see Graph 11: Biotech Crop
Countries and Mega-Countries) In the year 2004, the US, one of 14 designated
Biotech Mega-Countries, contributed to more than 58 % of total biotech crop
production. Overall, the global production value of biotech crops amounted to more
than estimated US$ 4.7 billion, which accounted for approximately 16% of the US$
30 bil l ion global commercial seed market (ISAAA, 2004). These figures are
especially essential when witnessing the rapid growth of GM corn and cotton planting
in the United States. In 2001, the percentage of genetically engineered corn
amounted to 26 o/" of all corn, and 69 o/" of all upland cotton. This number increased
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to 2004 by the number of US GM corn planted increasing lo 45 o/", and 81.1 million
acres. Cotton established a percentage increase as well, as its total GM cotton
acreage increased from 15.5 mill ion in 2001, which amounted to a staggering 69 %
to 13.5 mill ion, a decrease in terms of acreage to 13.9 mill ion in 2004, but a
percentage increase to 76 "h (PEWAG, 2004 ; see Table 4: Maior US GM Crops). ln
terms of profits, as reported in Monsanto's 2004 Annual Report, 47 o/o of its seeds
and genomics gross profit comes from corn seeds and traits. Taking into account
that North America accounts 59 % of sales by geographic region, it becomes
apparent hat more than a quarter of its profits from seeds and genomics are
achieved with in the US (Monsanto,2OO4).
Granted a possible decrease in corn and cotton production within the US and
a resulting reduction in profits would consequently have an immense impact on such
large companies as Monsanto. lt is for this reason that we need to take a broader
view of the issue by stepping 'outside' the agricultural setting and examining the
'whole package' of the Doha Development Round. As WTO General Director
Supachi himself recently stated in an address to African and Nordic Ministers, "[...]
progress in agriculture alone is not sufficient. We need the other areas of the
negotiations to also make progress. The network of linkages between different areas
and issues is well known. We can certainly not wait for results in agriculture before
making further progress in NAMA [Non-Agricultural Market Access], Services, Rules
and all the other areas" (WTO News, 2005). Taking this holistic view, it becomes
apparent why Monsanto, which holds significant leverage within the structural body
of the WTO, is not opposed to the current proceedings; while agricultural markets
within the US might dry up, several new springs of agricultural possibilities will be
opened by freeing up the agricultural trading landscape. As noted earlier, several
African countries are currently contemplating integrating GM crops within their
farming operations. The strengthening of the Singapore issues and TRIPS, etc., not
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only facilitate that process, but also are aided by an increase in the free movement of
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goods, services and capital across the globe. Consequently, the reduction in
subsidies within a US context could l ikely result in an increasing proliferation of
biotech, as well as agro-chemical and other agricultural services abroad. Thus, the
quest ion raised by Kirsten and Sartor ius in their  intr iguing art ic le "Linking
agribusiness and small-scale farmers in developing countries: is there a new role for
contract farming?" needs to be kept in mind while evaluating the movements towards
"agricultural industrialization" i  developing countries (Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002,
p.1ff).
lmpact #3: Genetically-modified Intensification and Dependency
One of the nations that presents itself as an obvious choice for expansion is
South Africa. Having adopted a "promotional pproach" towards GM crops through
its earlier mentioned GM act, estimates were that 95 o/o of its cotton farmers were
using Monsanto's Bt-cotton by 200112002 (Ledermann, 2003). Occupying the largest
share of development'space' in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa has positioned
itself at the cutting edge of the biotechnological revolution through the creation of a
network of research centers within the private sector and universities. Consequently,
it is marked by a strong private, public cooperation as well as 'state of the art'
intellectual property rights (ibid.). Thus, the groundwork for an increase in
investments into the modernization of agriculture have been established, especially
in the, from a GM perspective, lesser-developed corn market.
Given that the potential for further intensificationsl exists, the thesis needs to
be evaluated whether or not the South African farmers will actually benefit from the
reduction of subsidies and the Framework agreement. As established earlier, the
cotton market presently is not shaped for the export market, as all cotton has been
used within a domestic context. Nevertheless it presents itself as a very important
source of income for severalthousands of small-scale farmers who depend on the
cotton harvest for their food security. Consequently, a small increase in the prices
received would certainly strengthen their livelihoods, especially if implemented with
conjunct policies of reducing the 'hungry seasons'through the building of storage
silos, encouraging a return to traditional agricultural methods, such as increasing the
diversity of planting cycles, etc. Overall, as pointed out by Todd Moss and Alicia
Bannon, the possibility certainly exists, as found in two case studies, that a 10 % of
price increase could lead to a3O%" increase in food security (Moss and Bannon,
2oo4).
However, taking into account the earlier discussed account of South Africa's
agricultural sector being marked by a liberal, yet highly integrated verticaloligopoly,
one could expect that only a small trickle down effect might be likely to occur.32 As
articulated within the recent "The State of Agricultural Commodity Markets" report by
31 The gains from the application of Bt-cotton however need to be more closely evaluated, not
only in economic terms, using the language of 'gross-margins', but also from the perspective
of ecological sustainability. From another perspective, however, it is clear that the potential
for intensification and expansion of production does exist, as after falling production for
several years, "producers responded to a sharp increase in the real producer prices of white
and yellow maize and have increased their harvest area" for the last two production seasons
(NDA, 2003, p.145). ln addition, the milling industry does stil l hold potential, as it currently is
running at around 80 % of its available capacity.
32 This is mainly true for the corn market.
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the FAO, "at the international level, a few vertically integrated companies have
gained increasing control over agricultural trade" (FAO (2), 2004, p.31). Furthermore,
as observed with the prominence of less than a handful of retailers in the South
African market, "supermarkets'domination of the market gives them significant
leverage over production, distribution and trade, including through direct involvement
with developing country suppliers' (ibid., p.31). This effect of concentration is
especially pronounced within the maize sector and will likely affect simultaneously
large- and small-scale farmers.33
Furthermore, these farmers clearly run the danger of increasing their
dependency by the application ofGM seeds as the vertical integration of the
commodity chain would be extended vertically downwards to the seed. As Mariam
Mayet, the director of the anti-GM Centre for Biosafety in South Africa has argued,
"multi-national companies [most prominently Dow Agrosciences and Monsanto] [are]
seeking nurseries in the south hemisphere for the production of GM seeds for export
to the United States" (CapeTimes, 2005). Filing an objection last year with the
Department ofAgriculture, it has successfully lobbied the government, as of early
this year, to "turn down an application by multi-national Dow Agrosciences to test its
genetically modified (GM) maize in South Africa" (ibid.). One of the main reasons for
objection by the government was the unknown potential impact of pesticide-resistant
GM maize on non-target species. Furthermore, Dow explicitly stated in their
application that the reason for their filed trials was "to gather information to
substantiate European Union registrations" (ibid.). Consequently, while the
dependency inthe lesser important cotton sector on GM production has already well
s Small scale farmers however might be enjoying a considerable disadvantage as they are
less able than larger farmers to create an alliance that could constitute a challenge to the
strong maize oligopoly.
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progressed, GM maize has not yet fully established itself within the South African
market.
Furthermore, large-scale maize farmers in South Africa have become
increasingly dependent on large loans both from the governmental Land Bank, as
well as commercial banks. As news of the current harvest estimates trickle in,
severalfarmers are threatened going 'belly-up'as they are forced to default on loans
due to an extremely low and volatile maize price. Holding more than 3.2 million tons
of maize stocks and having expanded production areas from previous years, farmers
are faced with current prices which are well below the R900 that would be need in
order to "cover their input costs "and we are not even talking about profit"" (Njobeni,
2005). Currently, the market price for white maize stands at their lowest level ever,
with R512, having dropped by more than R50034 due to an over-supply and a lack of
drought (Reuters, 2005). Ultimately, it becomes apparent hat the current strategy of
intensification might not be profitable or even applicable within the present context.
From a macro-economic perspective, the opening up of the agricultural
market of the developed countries would not greatly affect South Africa's maize
market, as presently, in years when maize surpluses exist, "South Africa exports
maize mainly to Zimbabwe, Japan, Zambia, Malawi, Maurit ius, Kenya and
Mozambique" (NDA, 2OO3, p.1a6). Consequently, unless vast increases in output
would take place, South Africa is unlikely to become a major player outside of an
African context in the maize market. Thus, while subsidies reduction would
s Due to the liberalization efforts undertaken within a post-apartheid context, which included
the deregulation of the industry and the abolishment of the Maize Board in 1997, prices have
been determined under free market condition through the trading at the SAFEX.
Consequently, some analysts advocate for farmers to take part within the global 'gamble'of
focking in their harvest through the purchase of futures on the maize markets. lf they would
have undertaken so, they could have locked in last fall, when the price was around R1000
and sold presently without having to deal with the loss of R400 since then.
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potentially increase the price due to a drop of supply on a global scale, the issue of
tariff reductions i  of lesser importance, as South Africa engages most prominently in
regional trading. Nevertheless, due to maize's crucial role within the domestic
context and in relationship to the issue of domestic food self-sufficiency, the
continuation of a strong sector is of utmost importance. Consequently, a short-term
price increase might most likely benefit South African large-scale farmers the most,
as they are operating under a l iberalized market setting and hold the necessary
capacity and capital to increase production.
lmpact # 4: Sustainabifity of Maize and Cotton Price Increase
This importance is heightened within the Malian economy, both in the context
of maize and cotton production. Maize in Mali has been established as an important
source of nutrition in a domestic ontext, whereas cotton's importance is much
further eaching in terms of scale due to its rising importance as the main export
crop. Overall, agriculture accounts for as much as 92.3 % of total export products in
2003. Consequently, as Mali's small- and large-scale farmers are to profit in the
short-term the most from any global price gains, it is important to question the
potential sustainability of such gains in the long-term.
As has been welldocumented by several authors, commodity prices in
general and cotton prices in particular have been marked by a steady historical
decline, as wellan omnipresent high seasonalvolatility (FAO (1), 2OO4, Moseley,
2OO4). Commodity prices consequently are not only marked by the laws of supply
and demand, but have become integrated within the global economy and its various
stockmarkets, where traders, with imperfect information, are making decisions on
potential vulnerability of production output, and consequently integrate their own
perception of risks within the current price3s. To illustrate this occurrence, as we can
see in Graph 11, 12 and Table 5, overall, the African agricultural commodity sector
has undergone a historical depression
over the last 40 years if analyzed from a
having suffered the most due to increasing worsening of terms of trade. As estimated
by the World Bank, "between 1970 and 1997 declining terms of trade cost non-oil-
exporting countries in Africa the equivalent of 119 % of their combined annualgross
domestic product (GDP) in lost revenues" (FAO, 2004, p.13).
s A recent example is the reaction of traders to the final WTO dispute ruling in early March
that declared US cotton subsidies illegal. On news of this decision, cotton futures rose to 51
cents / lb for May deliveries. They are expecting a "bullish" market, signified by lower cotton
planting and rising globalcotton demand, which has led to its highest level since October
2004. However, fears already exist that "prices have climbed too fast [... as the textile mills
might notl consume the excess supply of both U.S. and world cotton." Furthermore, as shown
in the earlier South African case, drought forecasts have also been actively integrated.
Overall, consequently, the short market reaction is an indicator of the expectations of traders
(Purchasing.com, 2005).
Graph 11
Source:
FAO,
"State...",
2004
Graph 12
Source: FAO,
'State...",
2004
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Iable 5 1961-63 1971-73 1981-83 1991-93 2001-o2
Cotton 146 158 128 70 40
Maize 5.5 4.4 2.5 1 . 7
Source: Oxfam,2002
Prices are defleated by the United Sfafes Consumer Price lndex: 1995=l)
Cotton: US cents/lb
Maize US$/bushel
Second, as illustrated in Graph 12 "Cotton exports grow but income lags",
while one common revenue to a decline in terms of trade due to falling export
earnings and rising food import prices is to increase production, this attempt to offset
the losses become increasingly non-compatible. Asa matter of fact, while countries
(including Mali)36 that depend on cotton as a single agricultural commodity for more
than 20 % of their total revenues have significantly increased their export volumes,
they have not seen the corresponding increase in export revenues. Thus, as in the
case of cotton, while export volumes have increased in these 6 countries by more
than 40 % during the 1990s, the revenues have respectively dropped by 4 % during
the same period. Consequently, needing the foreign exchange derived from exports
in order to repay earlier debts, as well as pay for food imports, several developing
countries have been hurt considerably b  the high volatility of cotton and maize
prices. As illustrated by a lMFMorld Bank study, the past "sharp drop in the prices of
key export commodities [were] the main reason why the ratio of debt to exports had
worsened angerously in 15 heavily indebted poor countries" (ibid., p.21).
This sharp drop in prices is a linear phenomenon cutting across alltraditional
agricultural export commodities. As illustrated inTable 5, both cotton and maize
prices measured in real terms have declined consistently over the past 40 years
(ibid.). Consequently, when evaluating the potential increase in price due to an
sThese countries are CentralAfrican Republic, Togo, Mali, Benin, Chad, Burkina Faso.
elimination i US and EU subsidies, while a 4 "/" increase in the price has been
realistically estimated in the aftermath of the current WTO decision, as mentioned
earlier, the estimated price increases range from 2.8 "/" lo 29.7 , with an average of
16 % (FAO (1),2OO4; see Table 6: "Estimated impacts of developed country subsidy
removalon world prices, ..."). Having observed the generaldownward trend from a
historical perspective, the damning question on the sustainability and longevity of
these price increases needs to be asked. Thus, a potential 16 percent increase in
world cotton and maize prices through the successful implementation f the WTO
Framework Agreement and the Cotton Dispute Settlement, appears like a drop of
water on a hot stove, given the structural long-term forces, as manifested in the
declining terms of trade and world agricultural commodity prices.
The matter is further complicated by forces that lie outside the traditional
economical analysis. As illustrated earlier, cotton prices have been effected not only
by the laws of supply and demand, but as well by traders' perception of risks,
physical circumstances and the decisions undertaken by major cotton actors. As
mentioned earlier, China, due to its commanding volume of cotton processed each
year, has a great amount of influence on the annual volatility of the cotton market.
Acting as both a producer (exporter) as well as an importer, China's levelof net
imports of raw cotton has been ascribed as "the single most important factor
affecting world cotton prices" (Cotton Incorporated). China currently accounts for
"over 25 % of world cotton production and nearly 35 % of consumption" (FAO (1),
2OO4, p.3tf). At the moment, as it is unclear whether or not China is currently
subsidizing cotton production, analysts are unsure what impact an increase in world
prices would have on Chinese production. Given the past strong response in
200212003 inChina, when a 2O "/" increase in the domestic otton price led to a 26 "h
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increase in production area, the world's largest cotton producer clearly amounts to
one of the main factors affecting prices in a post-US-EU-subsidies environment.
In summary, it thus becomes prevalent that increases in cotton prices due to
a reduction in subsides, while beneficial in the short erm, are not only also affected
in the short{erm by a multitude of other factors, but as well placed in stark opposition
with the historicaltrends observed above . Consequently, assuming a continued
worsening of the terms of trade for agricultural products, while greater benefits will be
reaped from the cotton production i  the shorter term, increased global supply as a
reaction to these higher prices, or expectations of higher prices, will reduce any prior
short erm benefits as demand for cotton will most likely not increase dramatically.3T
Having thus questioned the long term sustainability of cotton production i  terms of
revenue, as well as from an ecological standpoint in the discussion of Mali (Moseley
37 As a matter of fact, a large part of US cotton spending was devoted towards a marketing
campaign, as witnessed on US TV that pitches cotton as a natural, American good and
consequently tries to eliminate its archenemy, cheaper polyester.
and Logan, 2003), I will evaluate as a final point the issue of food security.
pr{cg {cQ |rg http ta||ln fi
thliad ttaoa Eunpesn
{lq Uf}lon t'L}
Tatrlc l: Esfmsbd tnpaots ol dsrslopsd cotrrtry et&sHy rarnovnl sn sorNd plcsq EU anil US
producf*om bvo{E ardtlm ren*ting lncrs.ase InW*stand Sastml Atdcan tW0A}expartaarnhgo
rldpstll*effias
tusrnb)
Table 6
Source:
FAO,2004
o&r {ax}s*}"
sl'tl
Fiu
SD
FJD
GoirE{D( {l{}0S}
nAc {ffie}
aAc(zwlr
s00q&1
9001/oe
FAS (soo4)
FApRI{soor}
Rserrc* atd{s{t01f
*rnwref {aooe}
Tokarick tAffi$)
0.675
0.6ffi
o.70
0.743
0.58S - 0.6{9
0.742
a,742
0.738
0.691 - 0.60
8.4V4
o.644
o.688
e6.a
tg.a
25.2
a"s
10-48
16.'t - st.7
70.6
1l&
IE
na.
ts- a8
20
n
&
?.9- t8.4
?.9.7
21
7?'.*4
2.'.S.- 5.0
1 1 . 4
t$.7
t2.e
2.8
1t"2
a.$
ts.6
1"5
e"e- 14.7
t , q - r 4 p
4.7
r6'9
29.1
&6
ffi6"5
#t.8
35{.5
'I935
s7- ?54
w4
SOil
30
gt"87
76
t t6
26
Sprsm: Ba**d sr Shrl (tr!41
tThs tlDtsurdesnnlorrnrodcl3cm$ho:8=*glgMe{rgt;Ekrgnpntcdfld{pt U= twornsblHty;t} = Oitb|wrtHe'd
el{r$d$ ^ Fnr ths sgtpntsd |trdkd s"s{f|l;do{\ ths wtrld phe ir m rwrlp smcs s.pn nts
1ffi serdes|.m rnootof r*$p8frrndatmlstrdst{sx€ptfclic Ws}{rdHcsr{* tr{oi}ydrd|ils3$Olm&t|.Ag&rCsflld
frhe ln30o0&01 = l.Hp,f,gblouJ|lmdd frioch z0s{lts = U$$o.$1e/b.
tfufllord of [$sporitr$y
tThevshrtof T2ptrsmtr€pflbdh FAOh s*i6rsdbymrry tob* er fl.rHordrbthsvsry lrfl iloddprt0e drhryfb
dnRdrlbfl y*s- se ds.rstbrfir basreyerbel*.
sWtnrn*xprelrd*tsW0A lrynpn bnole$ldtty *tdodkr r st,r}, fp vdrpin lln t$elrs*ilrnnbdhy urhU r*don sfCy
ery*tim hrl{C* ta&kl*p rtrtlotd nrpnrtorr*Us 1nnembd by fp }*mse hilorldfrloe.
lmpact #5: Food Security for the small- and large-scale farmer
Estimating the ultimate impact of the WTO Framework agreement on small-
and large-scale farmers, we need to establish a concrete understanding of the
concept of food security. Expanding across four scales, the international, national,
household and individual, the Framework for food security and the diversity of its
conceptualization s enormous. While presently, according to Maxwell, over "two
hundred ifferent definitions of the term" do exist, its source lies in the 1970s, when it
was applied as an indicator of a "nation's aggregate food production" (Norton, 2004,
p.99). Generally, this concept has evolved to our present understanding, which
stresses "the ability of poor households to gain access to food in the necessary
amounts" (ibid., p.99). Consequently, while a discourse of the definitions of food
security might be an interesting avenue for further exploration, I will use the well-
known food security definition presented by the FAO Committee on World Food
Security, which states that food security means that "all people at all times have both
physical and economic access to the basic food they need" (USAID 1992).
To briefly elaborate on this definition, the important key element is tood
access . While food self-sufficiency highlights the importance of access to locally
produced food without having to depend upon externaldonors and commercial
imports, food access 'expands'this access both in terms of its geographicalscale
and through the introduction of capitalist modes of production, with the introduction of
cash-crops, and a focus on trade as a means for 'securing'this access. To cite the
USDA definition of this concept of food access, it stresses that "individuals have
adequate incomes or other resources to purchase or barter to obtain levels of
appropriate foods need to maintain consumption of an adequate dieVnutrition level"
( ib id . ) .
It stands consequently in stark contrast to policies proposing nationwide food
self-sufficiency. These policies have generally been characterized as a costly, if not
impossible, approach, that induces the dangers of an autarkic approach with a
historical quest "to extracting rural produce cheaply to feed cities, creating perverse
incentives, harming food output and employment and worsening undernutrition"
(Norton, 2OO4, p.101). Thus, as advocated by Norton, the'fundamental lesson'
learned from past mistakes is that "to achieve improved levels of nutrition in rural
households, cropping patterns should be allowed to follow comparative advantage,
and farmers should not be given artificial incentives to grow basic foods. The surest
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This comparative advantage has continually been linked during both the
colonial and post-colonialera in the Malian context with the 'white gold', cotton.
Granted that over 200'000 farmers, and over 93 % of farm households in the CMDT
zone, depend on cotton as their source of income, it becomes apparent hat any
increase in producer price with other food prices staying stable could result in a
significant strengthening of food security in terms of increasing their abilities to
purchase food crops. Long-term trends have shown that, while the internal
autarchical strategy has largely been abandoned, least-developed countries have
moved from holding a net surplus of agricultural products up through the 1980s to an
expanding net deficit of close to $5 billion by 20O2. (see Graph 13: "Agricultural trade
balance of least developed countries, 1961-2002") Furthermore, future projections by
the FAO predict that by the year 2030, "the net food trade deficit of developing
countries is expected to swellto more than US$50 billion in constant 1997-99 US$"
(ibid.). Thus, while an increasing net deficit exist, from a macro scale, food security
and insecurity appears to be closely related to three indicators of international trade:
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the share of food impods in total merchandise xports, the share of food aid in food
imports and the share of total food imports in calories available for consumption (ibid.
p.19). Consequently, asseen in Graph 14 below, the food insecure countries, while
devoting a large part of their export earnings towards imports of food crops, "cover a
smaller share of their apparent consumption from food imports" (ibid.).
Consequently, it becomes apparent that in order to increase their food
Graph 14
Source: FAO,
"State.. ".2OO4
securitfs, presently food insecure countries "might import even more food to cover
shortfalls in domestic production and ensure food security if they were not
constrained by limited export earnings" (ibid.). Thus, recalling the current rends
proposed by the global and national actors away from food self-sufficiency in the 70s
and 80s towards agricultural production with the goalof achieving food security, this
present data seems to suggest that this trend is well underway and no future return
to former policies in an increasingly open, networked and globalized economy is
foreseeable.
Finally, this endeavor is also supported by further data sets that suggest that
past food spikes, while still currently being detrimental to national economies that are
s lt is however important o point out that the break in food security categorization appear to
be drawn rather random. Furthermore, the graph does not address the question of the reason
for this phenomenon directly.
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heavily dependent upon a small number of economic export and import goods, have
vastly been reduced and resulted in a, at least perceived, increasing sustainability of
this policy approach. (see Graph 15: "Distribution ofthe incidence of import price
spikes...") Calculations by Diaz et al. show that the coefficient of variability lor maize
($lmt; and cotton (cents/kg) has decreased from 0.21 in 1960-1999 to 0.16 in the
Interestingly, not only South Africa has moved towards a greater liberalization
of their markets, with the major exception of sugar, but so has Mali, with the major
exception of cotton. Receiving considerable international support (PRMC;
Programme de Restructuration du Marche Cerealier), as well as under pressure by
the World Bank under its SAP (StructuralAdjustment Program), the government
deregulated their cereal markets tarting in 1981. Investigating the response of
cerealtraders to this market reform effort in the cereaf sector, Demb6f6 and Staatz
found that while these market reforms failed at resolving "all the problems of cereals
marketing and food security in Mali", as it did ignore structural problems on the
1990s for maize and from 0.19 to 0.14 for cotton respectively (Diaz et al.,2OO2, p. Graph 15
Source: FAO,
"Statg. . . " ,2004
production and transportation side of farming, they nevertheless were "effective in
increasing competition, lowering costs, and improving physical access to coarse
grains by consumers" (Dembele and Staatz, 2000, p.159ff). Consequently, their
study seems to support he liberal assumption that the sale of state enterprises,
permitting private sector involvements will increase competition and efficiency,
resulting ultimately in greater producer and lower consumer prices, as well as more
'equal'food distribution. A case in point are the marketing margins, which decreased
due to the increasing competition, and fell by almost 2O "/" tor "millet and sorghum
between Bamako and its two major supplying areas" (ibid., p.153). Furthermore,
"most evidence suggests that the reduction in marketing margins was passed back
to farmers in the form of higher prices" (ibid., p.153). However, it is important to note
that the larger traders, due to the lower margins available in the grain trade, decided
to invest elsewhere, and smaller traders "responded most dramatically" investing
heavily into trucks and storage capacities (ibid.). Consequently, through market
reforms, these smaller traders, which used to operate in the shadow economy under
the monopoly of the OPAM (Office Malien des Produits Agricoles) and faced
repression, moved into the formal economy and could increase their profits as well
as reduce their margins, as they no longer were "forced to operate clandestinely"
(ibid., p.148ff).
Filling the gap, these traders 'exploited'this newly gained freedom of access
to all regional markets across the country (including neighboring countries) as they
"moved cereals to areas where prices were most attractive" (ibid. p.156). Measuring
the average correlation of retail millet prices across the urban market areas in Mali,
Dembele and Staatz found an increase "from 0.70 in the mid-1980s to 0.97 during
the 1990s" (ibid., p.156). Overall, trade flows have increased ramatically, partially
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due to the devaluation of the CFA as well as the removalof imporl and export
restrictions both in Mali and neighboring countries. In summary, on a regional evel,
the market reforms have lead to greater physical availability of grains in markets that
previously were marked by food deficits. However, when taking the international
economy into account, a clear "risk" exists that due to the increasing competition with
wealthier neighboring countries, such as Cote D'lvoire and Senegal, "some Malian
consumers may be priced out of the market" (ibid., p.1560. Furthermore, any market
instability, be it local, national, regional or global, will have an effect now on the
market prices as they are no longer protected from outside 'ripples'.
Taking into account this decrease in price stability due to internationalization
of trade, food security does not seem to have improved accordingly. As the reforms,
while successful in reducing the costs of grain distribution, marketing costs as well as
retail prices, poor people still lack the purchasing power necessary to purchase
grains in periods of low supply, exchange fluctuations and the resulting high price
volatility. Consequently, improving access for the poorest lies outside the current
market reforms undertaking under the PRMC and would "require a much broader
effort to reduce poverty and developed targeted social safety nets in Mali" (ibid.,
p .161 ) .
Evaluating the effect of past policy measures undertaken in post-Apadheid
South Africa, Nick Vick finds that deregulation of the grain market, which included the
abolition of price fixing mechanisms, resulted similar to the Malian case in increased
opportunities for traders and "small and medium-scale businesses in processing and
distributing maize and maize products" (Vick, 2004, p.162). As prices are
increasingly coupled to the world market level, farmers in general have responded by
either reducing their input costs and/or increasing their agricultural asset
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diversification aswell as increasing concentration f operations. Thus, Nay observed
an overall "increase in the number of smaller commercial farms and an overall
increase in the average farm Size" (ibid., p.157). Overall, the real price for food has
decreased in the rural areas in South Africa as the concept of comparative
advantage has been more strongly applied within the liberalized setting.
Consequently, for example, with the retreat of the "'single-channelfixed price'
marketing regime [that was] characterized by pan-territorial and pan-seasonal
pricing", prices took into account such factors as transportation costs, as well as the
regional dynamics of supply and demand. In summary, farmers in South Africa have
responded to this abolition by diversifying their livelihood strategies through
increased parttime farming, adhering to contract farming or price hedging, supported
by the creation of the SAFEX and other agricultural futures market, resulting in
"greater certainty and lower transaction costs" (ibid., p.162).
However, smaller farmers seems to have been the most negatively atfected
as first governmental spending on agricultural research3s was cut back, leaving
several smallfarmers without any support services in the country. Secondly, due to
the decline in employment within the large-scale farming sector, attributed to the
introduction ofa minimum wage, and the reluctant pace of land redistribution, which
3e Of course public spending, while reduced, was to a certain degree offset by private sector
research, especially in South Africa. However, it becomes evident that adhering to the
principles of economies of scale and profit-maximization, these companies and research
enterprises largely tend to reach the large-scale producers. Furthermore, an interesting issue
arises, such as the Fiscal Year 1995 Appropriations Act and its "Bumpers Amendment, i.e.
"the US directive against providing assistance to local agriculturalcommodities'producers
whose exports may compete with US agricultural production" (USAID, 2002, p.32).
Consequently, even though in high demand, the hands are tied for the world's largest aid
organization, USAID, to undertake any strengthening of agricultural cotton research within the
Malian context.
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account for less than 2 o/o so fat, Vick argues that the rural farmers' food securit/o
has not improved. Furthermore, with the absence of effective governmental
structures to reach these rural poors with the social service programs, a task usually
undertaken by their former large-scale farming employers, rural farmers engaging in
export-oriented agriculture have increasingly become polarized in two classes, in
which a "privileged minority of households succeed in developing multiple livelihood
strategies based on skills and predictable income, while a poorer majority of
households increasingly find their established strategies undermined and often move
on in search of better locations from which they will attempt to develop a new
strategy" (Vick, p.175ff). In conclusion, Vick paints a'dark picture'for the rural,
traditional sector, as agricultural strategies are increasingly undermined by lack of
governmental support and safety nets, women are experiencing increased
vulnerabilities and a generaltrend towards pushing for "rights to residence [that]take
precedence over rights to cultivation and grazing" (ibid., p.176ff). Thus, a great need
exists to get a better understanding of rural-urban migration on a regional scale,
supported with a food security monitoring system, in order to provide for the more
than 12 million people, 25 "/o of the whole population, that are involved irectly or
indirectly in the commercial or traditional rural agricultural sector (ibid., p.173ff). Vick
ultimately finds that the "multipliers from agricultural growth" theo4/1 is still well alive
and should receive its deserved attention in order to strengthen food security and
€ Vick rejects subsistence agriculture as a viable strategy, adhering to the conclusion of a
recent research report, ECl, which "concluded that the single most important determinant of
food security in South Africa is cash in hand [...] Unless agricultural production moves out ol
subsistence levels to some scale of commercialization, little impact on food insecurity and
poverty is possible" (ibid., p.168).
ar Agricultural growth theory suggests that for every dollar of increased earnings within
agriculture, additional spending will be created through a 'multiplication'of that dollar's
purchasing power. Thus, multipliers to non-tradables form agricultural income growth ranges
from below 2.0 (i.e. Niger) to above 2.75 (i.e. Burkina Faso) (Mellor, 1999, p.9).
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purchasing power of the rural populations, thus regurgitating the earlier thesis by
Norton that "adequate real price incentives in agriculture are important not only for
economic growth but also for alleviating rural poverty" (Norton, 2004, p.103).
To a great extent, this focus on seeing vulnerability and food insecurity as an
income problem, as opposed to a supply-side issue, is shared by Moseley and
Logan. In their work on "The Politics of Discourse, Famine Early Warning Systems
and Hunger in Africa", they argue that there is a considerable bias in the international
community towards interpreting food in-/security as a supply-side problem that, while
acknowledging the importance of the household level, is still largely focused on a
macro-level approach that ignores important developed nations' political economical
analysis (Moseley and Logan, forthcoming 2005, p.4). Demonstrating how this
supply-side approach is closely entrenched within the interests of Africa's largest
donors, they argue against the application ofearly warning systems as indicators of
vulnerability and conclude that "the inexactness of food security monitoring, means
that the national or international safety net will always be riddled with holes" (ibid.,
p .18) .
Consequently, inorder to evaluate the ultimate ffects we need to connect
the political economy of agriculturaltrade markets with the structural, supply-side
problems, as elaborated in the previous ection. Thus, any improvements infood
security, while higher prices garnered through reduced subsidies are an important
factor, will have come in over the long term "only about hrough reducing the real
costs of food production and distribution, coupled with broad-based income growth"
(Dione, 2000,, p.137). Both private and public investments will be needed in order to
ensure an improvement inboth physical infrastructure, aswell as technical support
to the farming communities. The role of the private trader, as well as the large-scale
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1 1. Policy Considerations
Having studied in-depth the potential outcomes of the WTO Framework
Agreement and the Cotton Dispute Settlement at large, and the farming sector within
the United States, South Africa and Mali in particular, it becomes evident hat no
clear-cut panacea exists. Dedicating this final section towards the proposition of
policy considerations, I will advocate for three wide-ranging avenues that all lead
towards the ultimate goal of increasing 'developmental space'within an increasingly
'modernized', liberalized and industrialized global agricultural setting. This expansion
or creation of developmental space within agriculture occurs at five levels: the global,
national, regional, local and the individual. While it will be impossible to cover all five
levels with due justice, all proposed avenues will ultimately be aiming at
strengthening or creating the flexibility and choice of the marginalized farmers in the
medium- to long-run without negatively limiting developmental space for equally
marginalized non-agricultural groups.
Having witnessed the decreasing political clout of the US agricultural sector,
as seen in the recent proposed budget cuts by President Bush, the first successful
legal agricultural challenge fought at the WTO by developing nations, and the partial,
yet in terms of modalities, incomplete victory achieved with the phasing out of
subsidies in the July 31't Framework Agreement, it becomes clear that the
bargaining power of developing nations on the global level has increased.
Consequently, a potential increase of developmental spacea2 appears to lie in the
horizon with the continued coherence of the G20.
However, in order to sustain this 'success story'in the long-term, these
nations hould invest heavily into the strengthening of their legal understanding and
capabilities to keep a check on the implementation f the rulings as well as during
the negotiations inthe Hong Kong summit and upcoming negotiations. This
academic public investment into strengthening the legal abilit/3 of both Mali's and
South Africa's negotiators will be key in monitoring this process of freer, less-
distorted agricultural trade. Furthermore, the role of scholars and NGOs in
articulating injustices'has increasingly heightened inthe age of globalization and the
internet revolution. Consequently, a dual-pronged approach should be taken,
through the creation of linkages between the bureaucracy, academia nd farmers,
which focuses on pointing out and challenging current violations, prohibiting past
violations from reoccurring and shaping future negotiations that strengthen and
defend any gained developmental space. Ultimately, while acknowledging the major
democratic and institutional shortcomings witnessed in the past in the WTO, I
strongly believe that each developing nation's possibility will be the greatest through
including and establishing itself with a commitment towards haping the international
trade rules from within. Of course, this long{erm strategy does not have to occur
a2 The increase of development space, according to Wade (2004), would include a shift away
from further trade homogenization towards granting states reasonable 'water'or acting room
to choose effective levels of national protection during times of volatility and infancy.
4 lt is important o note that the WTO is already offering several legal workshops, financed
usually by Northern countries, such as the Netherlands. While a major conflict of interest
exists with the United States certainly not wishing to be strengthening developing nations
ability to challenge their own subsidies through legal 'education', an interesting space does
exist as European nations have been battling against the US on the African continent to ban
GM crops. lt is within this context of a'GM-war'that several European anti-GM lOs, NGOs
and governments have provided legal advice and support, which increases their bargaining
power outside the realm of GM crops.
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unilaterally, as the perseverance of the G20 alliance has shown, overcoming many
real-politik obstacles. Overall, including the importance of the TRIPS, TRIMS and the
GATS in diminishing and limiting development space, the overarching oal should
not be simply to gain 'market access', but to appropriate for themselves the tools
necessary to create 'development space' and reversing the 'kicking away of the
development ladder', as described by Robert Wade (2003).
While one potential strategy of development space, as articulated by Wade,
is the well-discussed strategy of import substitution in the manufacturing sector, its
equivalent within the agricultural sector is traditional agriculture, free from contract
farming, with reduced dependency on non-organic fertilizer, pesticides and
herbicides, as well as patented seeds and a capable state that can protect their
market in cases of high volatility. All of these factors are represented to the extreme
in the struggle against biotech companies, such as Monsanto, through their highly
vertical production process, as well as their powerful lobbying and legal capacity
within and outside the WTO settinga. Taking into account he potential impact of the
WTO Framework in extending the reach of biotechnology and strengthening local
farmers'dependency on non-organic inputs, it becomes imperative that the national
governments implement policies that filter this power-imbalance. Granted that the
benefits and the disadvantages of biotechnologicalfarming are still largely unknown
and facts are abundant pointing in both directions, it appears to be most reasonable
for the legislature to adopt policies of a 'precautionary approach'45 towards
n As a matter of fact, several of past WTO high-ranking officers have held management
posts within Monsanto.
4s While several definitions exist, the most prominent one is the one found in the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, as set out in the declaration's 15th and 16th
principles. This precautionary approach requires that "when there are threats of serious or
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biotechnology, in order to regain a legal degree of autonomy within the industrialized
agricultural context. Furthermore, while not excluding the potential benefits of
biotechnology per se, governments should be vary of sacrificing their farmers and its
lands for field testing experiments, as seen in the case of South Africa, that are
aimed not towards helping improving food security of these farmers, but rather
strengthening their own role in the international market context. Given the immense
amount of funding that is invested on both pro- and contra-biotech actors'sides, both
Mali and South Africa would be well advised to include conditionalities into any
potential contracts or licenses handed out. Possible conditionalities could include,
but not be limited to, the sharing of information with public universities to promote the
biotechnological development of indigenous crops or the inclusion of financial credits
to smaller-scale farmers. Consequently, the goal would be to counteract, what
Moseley has observed as the trend that "international capital sought out the local
wealthy through agricultural extension programs in order to proliferate and intensify
cash cropping and its associated technologies" (Moseley, 2005, p.18).
Of course, while potentially economically beneficial in the short- to medium-
run, in Moseley's final analysis, it becomes evident that soil degradation appears to
be more closely linked to the technological methods of agricultural production, as
opposed to any index of poverty (ibid.). Thus, challenging the dominant discourse of
poverty induced environmental degradation, the overall ecological sustainability of
modernized maize and cotton production might be threatened in the long run with
increasing application ofpesticide and inorganic fertilizer, and threatens to
overshadow any shortterm economic gains achieved through more stable and
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmentaldegradation" (UNEP, 1992).
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higher world prices. Consequently, the government eeds to pay close attention to
both the economic, as well as the ecological sustainability of modernized agriculture
in order to avoid slipping into a 'straight-jacket'of increasingly marginalized yields,
soils and farmers.
Furthermore, governmental policies hould be established that go beyond the
push for liberalization f the cotton sector, as demanded by the World Bank, by
creating policies that counteract the establishment of monopolies and oligopolies in
the trading sector. This factor appears to be especially prevalent in the case of both
South Africa and Mali, whereas in South Africa the issue appears to expand well
beyond the trader into the retail sector. Of course, this national policy does not have
to be undertaken through limiting of the free trade, but rather through promoting
greater competition among these actors, supporting the democratic apacity of the
citizens in voicing their own opinion and strengthening and cooperating with the
farmers' unions as important actors in shaping fairer markets. Overall, extending
Amartya Sen's thesis on famines and democracy, both Malian and South African
governments, as their domestic influence in the agricultural markets are reduced,
should encourage the strengthening of accountability n order to not weaken the food
security of marginalized, rural population.
Finally, as seen in the case of South Africa and Mali, there is a great need for
continued governmental involvement acting as safety nets, as well as extension
agents that reach and support he small-scale farmers. This governmental support
however needs to be as dynamic and flexible as possible, in order to avoid
counteracting market incentives and not to prolong, as was the case in Mali, the
historical lack of support for intercropping, crop rotations, improved fallows and
diversification seen as integral in strengthening food security. One of the most
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promising avenues of policy involvement for the government certainly would be in the
provision of credits for small-scale farmersoo that are less attractive for
agribusinesses, as well as the support for the creation of locally owned storage
capacity systems, anti-monopoly fegislation4T, the creation of commodity exchange
markets and better diffusion of pricing information i order to provide for (temporary)
shelters from price volatility. Of course, this governmental support is largely financed
by multi- and bi-lateral donors that have previously viewed cotton as the key export
crop towards development. However, with an increasing focus on ecological
sustainability, hese governments might be able to garner a new influx of support by
developing organic otton, as an example, that will counteract many of the negative
effects associated with cotton production through increasing both its ecological,
reduced soildegradation, and economic, highest quality resulting in higher prices,
sustainabilit/8. One recent avenue of such production efforts has been undefiaken
in Mali and Kyrgyzstan with the support of several high-ranking Swiss governmental
and non-governmental aid agencies, such as Helvetas. Results form the 2OO2 and
2003 harvest have shown that not only yields, as compared to conventional cotton,
6 One of the most beneficial avenues to improve food security, I would argue, is the
possibility of supporting a group of farmers financially in order for them being able to buy into
storage and processing tacitities, for example, during the process of liberalization in order to
offset the negative effects observed in the case of South Africa. This is especially pertinent
within the context of Mali, where currently liberalization etforts in the cotton sector are
underway. Furthermore, in the case of South Africa, financial support for land redistribution
should be made more readily available, as the current process has been a disappointment.
47 As noted by Norton on the topic of anti-monopoly legislation, he points out that "legal
remedies for cases of abuse of the power of monopolies and oligopolies [...], can be made
available, and should be. Nevertheless, proving abuse is likely to be a cumbersome,
uncertain process, and the difficulties of doing so should not be underestimated, especially in
circumstances where judiciaries are relatively weak" (Norton, p.95).
€ As stated by Meier, the reasons for organic production vary from "occupational health and
opportunity to escape 'treadmill'of credits for inputs" for the producers to "Opportunity to turn
'faceless'community into a cleady profiled product" for the cotton and apparel industry.
Furthermore, a facilitated access to the Swiss cotton import market has been established,
and several international actors have stressed their interest or already purchased organic
cotton, including lkea, Nike, H&M and Patagonia (Meier, 2OO4).
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12. Conclusion
In conclusion, it consequently becomes clear that the issue of assessing the
impact of the WTO Framework Agreement on farmers in both the developed and
developing world is vastly complex and clear limitations inany study will exist.
Nevertheless, I hope to have clearly shown that the WTO Framework Agreement
currently can not be deemed a historic breakthrough for two main reasons. First, the
term breakthrough iscertainly inappropriate, as it will take up to 10 years to
implement the agreement if negotiation progress does not stall. Second, analyzing its
historicity, the agreement, while holding the potential to constitute a historic
achievement compared to the URAA, nevertheless will ultimately depend upon the
working out of the modalities at the Hong Kong Summit in December 2005. lt is
within this context that the earlier proposed policy consideration f strengthening the
legal capabilities becomes especially urgent and important to close legal oopholes,
such as the documented boxshifting activities, as well as increase development
space in the long-run.
Concerning the impact on small- and large-scale farmers, it appears that the
greatest beneficiary inboth the United States and Mali would be the smaller scale
farmers. ln South Africa, on the other hand, due to the high marketing margins and
their increasing marginalization within a liberalized setting, the larger-scale farmers
would be the ones that will reap the benefits of an increased price most readily.
Being able to respond to higher prices with increasing supply, they would most likely
be able to increase their own capital, consequently outcompeting smaller-scale
farmers even further.
Taking a step back, however, it becomes evident that in the longterm, the
price increase might prove to be unsustainable unless large-scale structural
economic changes would take place on a global level. However, as has become
evident in the earlier analysis of the WTO Framework Agreement and the Dispute
Settlement victory, these structural changes are not to be found within a setting of an
increasingly neo-liberal agricultural market. Thus, strategies of diversification at all
scales might prove to be the most successful avenue, through a reinvestment of
potential short-term increased agricultural profits into other sectors and agricultural
commodities, as well as through a return towards more traditional agricultural
approaches, e.g. inter-cropping, no-till and organic farming.
Ultimately, however, for future studies and the interested reader, three main
story-lines hould be kept in mind and on the academic and policy radar screen:
First, how long will the gained bargaining power of the G20 be sustained? Listening
to people having closer access to negotiations, severe deflections and internal
disputes have weakened the alliance's consistency and could undermine a great
achievement. Second, the modalities will be extremely important and as soon as
agreed upon, a wealth of reports will likely be released by the NGO armada, lead by
Oxfam, assessing the impacts. A special eye should be kept on the United States
farming lobbies, as their press releases tend to be very indicative of their true stance.
Concerning the DSM, Oxfam has already started as of March 2005 a new campaign
targeting rice subsidies in the US. Consequently, further rulings in favor of
developing nations may be very likely. Finally, in terms of agriculturaldevelopment,
two key events to be closely watched is the continued push for biotechnology in
Africa, such as the introduction of GM cofton in Mali, and the potentialfor an
increase in contract farming as agricultural specialization might occur. Both cases, I
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strongly believe, will turn out to be detrimental to the success of strategies on
strengthening food security as an increasing of concentration on the vertical
commodity chain will occur. Thus, it will only be through a complex action and
cooperation at several scales that developing and leasfdeveloped countries will be
able to 'climb up the development ladder'and increase their own development
space, counteracting the kick by the developed nations.
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Source: ERS/USDA, 2001
Export subsidy expenditure by country, 199$98
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Sosce: Economb Research Service, USDA
Commodity category 1 995 1 996 1 997 1 998 1 999
Wheat
Coarse grains
Rice
Oilseeds
Fibers
Fruits and vegetables
Sugar
Milk products
Wine
Beef
Pork
Poultry
Other meats
Livestock
Tobacco
Processed products
Other agricultural products
Total
169.3
420.O
55.3
83.3
0.4
166.3
512.9
2,547.1
75.7
2 ,010 .1
135.5
189.2
1 1 . 9
26.6
25.8
779.4
114.7
7,323.6
403.4
494.4
97.7
49.9
0.0
126.4
692.7
2,695.3
85.9
1,947.1
94.4
104.7
1 1 . 3
14.7
5.9
852.4
209.5
7,885.6
197.9
306.4
36.3
1 0 . 1
0.0
95.1
890.7
1,938.7
47.2
950.2
95.4
107.8
1 0 . 1
0.1
0.8
709.5
't59.0
562.9
864.5
28.7
2.7
0.0
89.8
913.2
1,992.9
35.5
732.5
403.7
128.8
2.2
o.2
0.9
747.5
161  .6
53'1.1
772.0
27.5
1 . 0
0.0
79.2
510 .0
2,255.1
27.4
808.0
288.5
102.2
2.6
1 . 2
0.0
841 .0
257.4
6,504.15,555.3 6,667.7
1/ Not all countries have notified as yet for this year.
Source: Economic Research Service (ERS) calculations from World Trade Organization (VWO) export subsidy notifications.
http :/lwww. ers. usda. gov/dbAlto/
Appendix lV
WTO July Framework Agreement
Doha Work Programme
Decision Adopted by the GeneralCouncil on 1 August2OO4
1. The General Council reaffirms the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions adopted at
Doha and the full commitment of all Members to give effect to them. The Council
emphasizes Members'resolve to complete the Doha Work Programme fully and to conclude
successfully the negotiations launched at Doha. Taking into account he Ministerial
Statement adopted at Cancfn on 14 September 2003, and the statements by the Council
Chairman and the Director-General t the Council meeting of 15-16 December 2003, the
Counciltakes note of the report by the Chairman of the Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC)
and agrees to take action as follows:
a. Agriculture: the General Council adopts the framework set out in Annex A to this
document.
b. Cotton: the General Council reaffirms the importance of the Sectoral Initiative on
Cotton and takes note of the parameters set out in Annex A within which the trade-
related aspects of this issue will be pursued in the agriculture negotiations. The General
Council also attaches importance to the development aspects of the Cotton Initiative and
wishes to stress the complementarity between the trade and development aspects. The
Council takes note of the recent Workshop on Cotton in Cotonou on 23-24 March 2004
organized by the WTO Secretariat, and other bilateral and multilateral efforts to make
progress on the development assistance aspects and instructs the Secretariat o
continue to work with the development community and to provide the Councilwith
periodic reports on relevant developments.
Members should work on related issues of development multilaterally with the
internationalfinancial nstitutions, continue their bilateral programmes, and all developed
countries are urged to participate. In this regard, the General Council instructs the
Director Generalto consult with the relevant internationalorganizations, including the
Bretton Woods lnstitutions, the Food and Agriculture Organization and the International
Trade Centre to direct effectively existing programmes and any additional resources
towards development of the economies where cotton has vital importance.
c. Non-agricultural Market Access: the General Council adopts the framework set
out in Annex B to this document.
d. Development:
Principles: development concerns form an integral part of the Doha Ministerial
Declaration. The General Council rededicates and recommits Members to fulfil l ing the
development dimension of the Doha Development Agenda, which places the needs and
interests of developing and least-developed countries at the heart of the Doha Work
Programme. The Council reiterates the important role that enhanced market access,
balanced rules, and well targeted, sustainably financed technical assistance and capacity
building programmes can play in the economic development of these countries.
Special and DifferentialTreatment: the General Council reaffirms that provisions for
special and differential (S&D) treatment are an integral part of the WTO Agreements.
The Council recalls Ministers'decision in Doha to review all S&D treatment provisions
with a view to strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and
operational. The Council recognizes the progress that has been made so far. The
Council instructs the Committee on Trade and Development in Special Session to
expeditiously complete the review of all the outstanding Agreement-specific proposals
and report to the General Council, with clear recommendations for a decision, by July
2005. The Council further instructs the Committee, within the parameters of the Doha
mandate, to address all other outstanding work, including on the cross-cutting issues, the
monitoring mechanism and the incorporation of S&D treatment into the architecture of
WTO rules, as referred to in TN/CTD|7 and report, as appropriate, to the General
Counci l .
The Council also instructs all WTO bodies to which proposals in Category ll have been
referred to expeditiously complete the consideration of these proposals and report to the
General Council, with clear recommendations for a decision, as soon as possible and no
later than July 2005. In doing so these bodies will ensure that, as far as possible, their
meetings do not overlap so as to enable full and effective participation of developing
countries in these discussions.
Technical Assistance: the General Council recognizes the progress that has been
made since the Doha Ministerial Conference in expanding Trade-Related Technical
Assistance (TRTA) to developing countries and low-income countries in transition. In
furthering this effort the Council affirms that such countries, and in particular least-
developed countries, should be provided with enhanced TRTA and capacity building, to
increase their effective participation in the negotiations, to facilitate their implementation
ol WTO rules, and to enable them to adjust and diversify their economies. In this context
the Councilwelcomes and further encourages the improved coordination with other
agencies, including under the lntegrated Framework for TRTA for the LDCs (lF) and the
Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme (JITAP).
lmplementation: concerning implementation-related issues, the General Council
reaffirms the mandates Ministers gave in paragraph 12 of the Doha Ministerial
Declaration and the Doha Decision on lmplementation-Related lssues and Concerns,
and renews Members'determination to find appropriate solutions to outstanding issues.
The Council instructs the Trade Negotiations Committee, negotiating bodies and other
WTO bodies concerned to redouble their efforts to find appropriate solutions as a priority.
Without prejudice to the positions of Members, the Councilrequests the Director-General
to continue with his consultative process on all outstanding implementation issues under
paragraph 12(b) of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, including on issues related to the
extension of the protection of geographical indications provided for in Article 23 of the
TRIPS Agreement to products other than wines and spirits, if need be by appointing
Chairpersons of concerned WTO bodies as his Friends and/or by holding dedicated
consultations. The Director-General shall report to the TNC and the General Council no
later than May 2005. The Council shall review progress and take any appropriate action
no later than July 2005.
Other Development lssues: in the ongoing market access negotiations, recognising
the fundamental principles of the WTO and relevant provisions of GATT 1994, special
attention shall be given to the specific trade and development related needs and
concerns of developing countries, including capacity constraints. These particular
concerns of developing countries, including relating to food security, rural development,
livelihood, preferences, commodities and nel tood imports, as well as prior unilateral
liberalisation, should be taken into consideration, as appropriate, in the course of the
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Agriculture and NAMA negotiations. The trade-related issues identified for the fuller
integration of small, vulnerable conomies into the multilateral trading system, should
also be addressed, without creating a sub-category of Members, as part of a work
programme, as mandated in paragraph 35 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration.
Least-Developed Gountries: the General Council reaffirms the commitments made at
Doha concerning least-developed countries and renews its determination to fulfil these
commitments. Members will continue to take due account of the concerns of least-
developed countries in the negotiations. The Council confirms that nothing in this
Decision shall detract in any way from the special provisions agreed by Members in
respect of these countries.
e. Services: the General Council takes note of the report to the TNC by the Special
Session of the Council for Trade in Servicesae and reaffirms Members' commitment o
progress in this area of the negotiations in line with the Doha mandate. The Council
adopts the recommendations agreed by the Special Session, set out in Annex C to this
document, on the basis of which further progress in the services negotiations will be
pursued. Revised offers should be tabled by May 2005.
f. Other negotiating bodies:
Rules, Trade & Environment and TRIPS: the General Counciltakes note of the
reports to the TNC by the Negotiating Group on Rules and by the Special Sessions of
the Committee on Trade and Environment and the TRIPS Council.e The Council
reaffirms Members'commitment to progress in all of these areas of the negotiations in
line with the Doha mandates.
Dispute Settlement: the General Council takes note of the report to the TNC by the
Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Bodfl and reaffirms Members'commitment
to progress in this area of the negotiations in line with the Doha mandate. The Council
adopts the TNC's recommendation that work in the Special Session should continue on
the basis set out by the Chairman of that body in his report to the TNC.
g. Trade Facilitation: taking note of the work done on trade facilitation by the Council
for Trade in Goods under the mandate in paragraph 27 of the Doha Ministerial
Declaration and the work carried out under the auspices of the General Council both
prior to the Fifth Ministerial Conference and after its conclusion, the General Council
decides by explicit consensus to commence negotiations on the basis of the modalities
set out in Annex D to this document.
Relationship between Trade and Investment, Interaction between Trade and
Competition Policy and Transparency in Government Procurement: the Council
agrees that these issues, mentioned in the Doha Ministerial Declaration in paragraphs
20-22,23-25 and 26 respectively, will not form part of the Work Programme set out in
that Declaration and therefore no work towards negotiations on any of these issues will
take place within the WTO during the Doha Round.
h. Other elements of the Work Programme: the General Council reaffirms the high
priority Ministers at Doha gave to those elements of the Work Programme which do not
4e This report is contained in document TN/S/16.
s The reports to the TNC referenced in this paragraph are contained in the following
documents: Negotiating Group on Rules - TN/RU9; Special Session of the Committee on
Trade and Environment - TN/TE/9; Special Session of the Councilfor TRIPS - TN/IP/10.
5t This report is contained in document TN/DS/10.
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involve negotiations. Noting that a number of these issues are of particular interest to
developing-country Members, the Council emphasizes its commitment to fulfilthe
mandates given by Ministers in allthese areas. To this end, the General Council and
other relevant bodies shall report in line with their Doha mandates to the Sixth Session of
the Ministerial Conference. The moratoria covered by paragraph 11.1 of the Doha
Ministerial Decision on lmplementation-related lssues and Concerns and paragraph 34
of the Doha Ministerial Declaration are extended up to the Sixth Ministerial Conference.
2. The General Council agrees that this Decision and its Annexes shall not be used in
any dispute settlement proceeding under the DSU and shall not be used for interpreting the
existing WTO Agreements.
3. The General Council calls on all Members to redouble their efforts towards the
conclusion of a balanced overalloutcome of the Doha Development Agenda in fulfilment of
the commitments Ministers took at Doha. The Council agrees to continue the negotiations
launched at Doha beyond the timeframe set out in paragraph 45 of the Doha Declaration,
leading to the Sixth Session of the Ministerial Conference. Recalling its decision of 21
October 2003 to accept the generous offer of the Government of Hong Kong, China to host
the Sixth Session, the Council lurther agrees that this Session will be held in December 2005.
Annex A
Framework for Establishing Modalities in Agriculture
1. The starting point for the current phase of the agriculture negotiations has been the
mandate set out in Paragraph 13 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration. This in turn built on the
long-term objective of the Agreement on Agriculture to establish a fair and market-oriented
trading system through a programme of fundamental reform. The elements below offer the
additional precision required at this stage of the negotiations and thus the basis for the
negotiations of full modalities in the next phase. The level of ambition set by the Doha
mandate will continue to be the basis for the negotiations on agriculture.
2. The final balance will be found only at the conclusion of these subsequent
negotiations and within the Single Undertaking. To achieve this balance, the modalities to be
developed will need to incorporate operationally effective and meaningful provisions for
special and differential treatment for developing country Members. Agriculture is of critical
importance to the economic development of developing country Members and they must be
able to pursue agricultural policies that are supportive of their development goals, poverty
reduction strategies, food security and livelihood concerns. Non-trade concerns, as referred
to in Paragraph 13 of the Doha Declaration, will be taken into account.
3. The reforms in allthree pillars form an interconnected whole and must be
approached in a balanced and equitable manner.
4. The General Council recognizes the importance of cotton for a certain number of
countries and its vital importance for developing countries, especially LDCs. lt will be
addressed ambitiously, expeditiously, and specifically, within the agriculture negotiations.
The provisions of this framework provide a basis for this approach, as does the sectoral
initiative on cotton. The Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture shall ensure
appropriate prioritization of the cotton issue independently from other sectoral initiatives. A
subcommittee on cotton will meet periodically and report to the Special Session of the
Committee on Agriculture to review progress. Work shall encompass alltrade-distorting
policies affecting the sector in all three pillars of market access, domestic support, and export
competition, as specified in the Doha text and this Framework text.
5. Coherence between trade and development aspects of the cotton issue will be
pursued as set out in paragraph 1.b of the text to which this Framework is annexed.
DOMESTIC SUPPORT
6. The Doha Ministerial Declaration calls for "substantial reductions in trade-distorting
domestic support". With a view to achieving these substantial reductions, the negotiations in
this pillar will ensure the following:
. Special and differential treatment remains an integral component of domestic
support. Modalities to be developed will include longer implementation periods and
lower reduction coefficients for all types of trade-distorting domestic support and
continued access to the provisions under Article 6.2.
. There will be a strong element of harmonisation in the reductions made by developed
Members. Specifically, higher levels of permitted trade-distorting domestic support
will be subject to deeper cuts.
. Each such Member will make a substantial reduction in the overall level of its trade-
distorting support from bound levels.
. As well as this overallcommitment, Final Bound Total AMS and permitted de minimis
levels will be subject o substantial reductions and, in the case of the Blue Box, will
be capped as specified in paragraph 15 in order to ensure results that are coherent
with the long-term reform objective. Any clarification or development of rules and
conditions to govern trade distorting support will take this into account.
Overall Reduction: A Tiered Formula
7. The overall base level of all trade-distorting domestic support, as measured by the
Final Bound TotalAMS pfus permitted de minimis level and the level agreed in paragraph 8
below for Blue Box payments, will be reduced according to a tiered formula. Under this
formula, Members having higher levels of trade-distorting domestic support will make greater
overall reductions in order to achieve a harmonizing result. As the first instalment of the
overall cut, in the first year and throughout he implementation period, the sum of all trade-
distorting support will not exceed 80 per cent of the sum of Final Bound Total AMS plus
permitted de minimis plus the Blue Box at the level determined in paragraph 15.
8. The following parameters will guide the further negotiation of this tiered formula:
. This commitment will apply as a minimum overallcommitment. lt will not be applied
as a ceiling on reductions of overall trade-distorting domestic support, should the
separate and complementary formulae to be developed for TotalAMS, de minimis
and Blue Box payments imply, when taken together, a deeper cut in overall trade-
distorting domestic support for an individual Member.
. The base for measuring the Blue Box component will be the higher of existing Blue
Box payments during a recent representative period to be agreed and the cap
established in paragraph 15 below.
Final Bound Total AMS: A Tiered Formula
9. To achieve reductions with a harmonizing effect:
. Final Bound TotalAMS will be reduced substantially, using a tiered approach.
. Members having higher Total AMS will make greater reductions.
. To prevent circumvention of the objective of the Agreement hrough transfers of
unchanged domestic support between different support categories, product-specific
AMSs will be capped at their respective average levels according to a methodology
to be agreed.
r Substantial reductions in Final Bound Total AMS will result in reductions of some
product-specif ic support.
10. Members may make greater than formula reductions in order to achieve the required
level of cut in overalltrade-distorting domestic support.
De Minimis
11. Reductions in de minimis will be negotiated taking into account the principle of
speciaf and differentialtreatment. Developing countries that allocate almost all de minimis
support for subsistence and resource-poor farmers will be exempt.
12. Members may make greater than formula reductions in order to achieve the required
level of cut in overall trade-distorting domestic support.
Blue Box
13. Members recognize the role of the Blue Box in promoting agricultural reforms. In this
light, Article 6.5 will be reviewed so that Members may have recourse to the following
measures:
. Direct payments under production-limiting programmes if:
- such payments are based on fixed and unchanging areas and yields;or
- such payments are made on 85% or less of a fixed and unchanging base
levelof production;or
- livestock payments are made on a fixed and unchanging number of head.
. Direct payments that do not require production if :
- such payments are based on fixed and unchanging bases and yields;or
- livestock payments made on a fixed and unchanging number of head; and
- such payments are made on 85% or less of a fixed and unchanging base
levelof production.
14. The above criteria, along with additionalcriteria will be negotiated. Any such criteria
will ensure that Blue Box payments are less trade-distorting than AMS measures, it being
understood that:
. Any new criteria would need to take account of the balance of WTO rights and
obligations.
. Any new criteria to be agreed will not have the perverse effect of undoing ongoing
reforms.
15. Blue Box support will not exceed 5"/" of a Member's average total value of agricultural
production during an historical period. The historical period will be established in the
negotiations. This ceiling will apply to any actual or potential Blue Box user from the
beginning of the implementation period. In cases where a Member has placed an
exceptionally large percentage of its trade-distorting support in the Blue Box, some flexibility
will be provided on a basis to be agreed to ensure that such a Member is not called upon to
make a wholly disproportionate cut.
Green Box
16. Green Box criteria will be reviewed and clarified with a view to ensuring that Green
Box measures have no, or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on production.
Such a review and clarification will need to ensure that the basic concepts, principles and
effectiveness of the Green Box remain and take due account of non-trade concerns. The
improved obligations for monitoring and surveillance of all new disciplines foreshadowed in
paragraph 48 below will be particularly important with respect to the Green Box.
EXPORT COMPETITION
17. The Doha Ministerial Declaration calls for "reduction of, with a view to phasing out, all
forms of export subsidies". As an outcome of the negotiations, Members agree to establish
detailed modalities ensuring the parallel elimination of all forms of export subsidies and
disciplines on all export measures with equivalent effect by a credible end date.
End Point
The following will be eliminated by the end date to be agreed:
Export subsidies as scheduled.
Export credits, export credit guarantees or insurance programmes with repayment
periods beyond 180 days.
Terms and conditions relating to export credits, export credit guarantees or insurance
programmes with repayment periods of 180 days and below which are not in
accordance with disciplines to be agreed. These disciplines will cover, inter alia,
payment of interest, minimum interest rates, minimum premium requirements, and
other elements which can constitute subsidies or otherwise distort rade.
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. Trade distorting practices with respect to exporting STEs including eliminating export
subsidies provided to or by them, government financing, and the underwriting of
losses. The issue of the future use of monopoly powers will be subject to further
negotiation.
. Provision of food aid that is not in conformity with operationally effective disciplines to
be agreed. The objective of such disciplines will be to prevent commercial
displacement. The role of international organizations as regards the provision of food
aid by Members, including related humanitarian and developmental issues, will be
addressed in the negotiations. The question of providing food aid exclusively in fully
grant form will also be addressed in the negotiations.
19. Effective transparency provisions for paragraph 18 will be established. Such
provisions, in accordance with standard WTO practice, will be consistent with commercial
conf identiality considerations.
Implementation
ZO. Commitments and disciplines in paragraph 18 will be implemented according to a
schedule and modalities to be agreed. Commitments will be implemented by annual
instalments. Their phasing will take into account the need for some coherence with internal
reform steps of Members.
21. The negotiation of the elements in paragraph 18 and their implementation will ensure
equivalent and parallel commitments by Members.
Special and Differential Treatment
22. Developing country Members witl benefit from longer implementation periods for the
phasing out of all forms of export subsidies.
23. Developing countries will continue to benefit from special and differential treatment
under the provisions of Article 9.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture for a reasonable period, to
be negotiated, afier the phasing out of all forms of export subsidies and implementation of all
disciplines identified above are completed.
24. Members will ensure that the disciplines on export credits, export credit guarantees
or insurance programs to be agreed will make appropriate provision for differentialtreatment
in favour of least-developed and net food-importing developing countries as provided for in
paragraph 4 of the Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the
Reform Programme on Least-Developed and Net Food-lmporting Developing Countries.
lmproved obligations for monitoring and surveillance of all new disciplines as toreshadowed
in paragraph 48 will be critically important in this regard. Provisions to be agreed in this
respect must not undermine the commitments undertaken by Members under the obligations
in paragraph 18 above.
25. STEs in developing country Members which enjoy special privileges to preserve
domestic consumer price stability and to ensure food security will receive special
consideration for maintaining monopoly status.
Special Circumstances
26. In exceptional circumstances, which cannot be adequately covered by food aid,
commercial export credits or preferential international financing facilities, ad hoc temporary
financing arrangements relating to exports to developing countries may be agreed by
Members. Such agreements must not have the effect of undermining commitments
undertaken by Members in paragraph 18 above, and will be based on criteria and
consultation procedures to be established.
MARKET ACCESS
27. The Doha Ministerial Declaration calls for "substantial improvements in market
access". Members also agreed that special and differential treatment for developing Members
would be an integral part of all elements in the negotiations.
The Single Approach: a Tiered Formula
28. To ensure that a single approach for developed and developing country Members
meets all the objectives of the Doha mandate, tariff reductions will be made through a tiered
formula that takes into account their different tariff structures.
29. To ensure that such a formula will lead to substantial trade expansion, the following
principles will guide its further negotiation:
. Tariff reductions will be made from bound rates. Substantial overalltariff reductions
will be achieved as a final result from negotiations.
. Each Member (other than LDCs) will make a contribution. Operationally effective
special and differential provisions for developing country Members will be an integral
part of all elements.
. Progressivity in tariff reductions will be achieved through deeper cuts in higher tariffs
with flexibilities for sensitive products. Substantial improvements in market access
will be achieved for all products.
30. The number of bands, the thresholds for defining the bands and the type ol tariff
reduction in each band remain under negotiation. The role of a tariff cap in a tiered formula
with distinct treatment for sensitive products will be further evaluated.
Sensitive Products
Selection
31. Without undermining the overall objective of the tiered approach, Members may
designate an appropriate number, to be negotiated, of tariff lines to be treated as sensitive,
taking account of existing commitments for these products.
Treatment
32. The principle of 'substantial improvement'will apply to each product.
33. 'substantial improvement'will be achieved through combinations of tariff quota
commitments and tariff reductions applying to each product. However, balance in this
negotiation will be found only if the final negotiated result also reflects the sensitivity of the
product concerned.
34. Some MFN-based tariff quota expansion will be required for all such products. A
base for such an expansion will be established, taking account of coherent and equitable
criteria to be developed in the negotiations. In order not to undermine the objective of the
tiered approach, for all such products, MFN based tariff quota expansion will be provided
under specific rules to be negotiated taking into account deviations from the tariff formula.
Other Elements
35. Other elements that will give the flexibility required to reach a final balanced result
include reduction or elimination of in-quota tariff rates, and operationally effective
improvements in tariff quota administration for existing tariff quotas so as to enable Members,
and particularly developing country Members, to fully benefit from the market access
opportunities under tariff rate quotas.
36. Tariff escalation will be addressed through a formula to be agreed.
37. The issue of tariff simplification remains under negotiation.
38. The question of the special agricultural safeguard (SSG) remains under negotiation.
Special and differential treatment
39. Having regard to their ruraldevelopment, food security and/or livelihood security
needs, special and differential treatment for developing countries witl be an integral part of all
elements of the negotiation, including the tariff reduction formula, the number and treatment
of sensitive products, expansion of tariff rate quotas, and implementation period.
40. Proportionality will be achieved by requiring lesser tarifl reduction commitments or
tariff quota expansion commitments from developing country Members.
4'1. Developing country Members will have the flexibility to designate an appropriate
number of products as Special Products, based on criteria of food security, livelihood security
and ruraldevelopment needs. These products will be eligible for more flexible treatment.
The criteria and treatment of these products will be further specified during the negotiation
phase and will recognize the fundamental importance of Special Products to developing
countries.
42. A Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) will be established for use by developing
country Members.
43. Full implementation of the long-standing commitment to achieve the fullest
liberalisation of trade in tropical agricultural products and for products of particular importance
to the diversification of production from the growing of illicit narcotic crops is overdue and will
be addressed effectively in the market access negotiations.
44. The importance of long-standing preferences is fully recognised. The issue of
preference erosion will be addressed. For the further consideration in this regard, paragraph
16 and other relevant provisions of TN/AGM/1/Rev.1 will be used as a reference.
LEAST. DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
45. Least-Developed Countries, which will have full access to all special and differential
treatment provisions above, are not required to undertake reduction commitments.
Developed Members, and developing country Members in a position to do so, should provide
duty-free and quota-free market access for products originating from least-developed
countries.
46. Work on cotton under all the pillars will reflect the vital importance of this sector to
certain LDC Members and we will work to achieve ambitious results expeditiously.
RECENTLY ACCEDED MEMBERS
47. The particular concerns of recently acceded Members will be effectively addressed
through specific flexibility provisions.
MONITORING AND SURVEILLANCE
48. Article 18 of the Agreement on Agriculture will be amended with a view to enhancing
monitoring so as to effectively ensure full transparency, including through timely and
complete notifications with respect to the commitments in market access, domestic support
and export competition. The particular concerns of developing countries in this regard will be
addressed.
OTHER ISSUES
lssues of interest but not agreed: sectoral initiatives, differential export taxes, Gls.
50. Disciplines on export prohibitions and restrictions inArticle 12.1 of the Agreement on
Agriculture will be strengthened.
Annex B
Framework for Establishing Modalities in
Market Access for Non-Agricultural Products
1. This Framework contains the initial elements for future work on modalities by the
Negotiating Group on Market Access. Additional negotiations are required to reach
agreement on the specifics of some of these elements. These relate to the formula, the
issues concerning the treatment of unbound tariffs in indent two of paragraph 5, the
flexibilities for developing-country participants, the issue of participation in the sectorial tariff
component and the preferences. ln order to finalize the modalities, the Negotiating Group is
instructed to address these issues expeditiously in a manner consistent with the mandate of
paragraph 16 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration and the overall balance therein.
49.
2. We reaffirm that negotiations on market access for non-agricultural products shall
aim to reduce or as appropriate liminate tariffs, including the reduction or elimination of tariff
peaks, high taritfs, and tariff escalation, as well as non-tariff barriers, in particular on products
of export interest to developing countries. We also reaffirm the importance of special and
differential treatment and less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments as integral parts
of the modalities.
3. We acknowledge the substantial work undertaken by the Negotiating Group on
Market Access and the progress towards achieving an agreement on negotiating modalities.
We take note of the constructive dialogue on the Chair's Draft Elements of Modalities
(TN/MAA/V/35/Rev.1) and confirm our intention to use this document as a reference for the
future work of the Negotiating Group. We instruct he Negotiating Group to continue its work,
as mandated by paragraph 16 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration with its corresponding
relerences to the relevant provisions of Article XXV|ll bis of GATT 1994 and to the provisions
cited in paragraph 50 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, on the basis set out below.
4. We recognize that a formula approach is key to reducing tariffs, and reducing or
eliminating tariff peaks, high tariffs, and tariff escalation. We agree that the Negotiating
Group should continue its work on a non-linear formula applied on a line-by-line basis which
shall take fully into account the special needs and interests of developing and least-
developed country participants, including through less than full reciprocity in reduction
commitments.
5. We further agree on the following elements regarding the formula:
- product coverage shall be comprehensive without a priori exclusions;
- tariff reductions or elimination shall commence from the bound rates after full
implementation of current concessions; however, for unbound tariff lines, the
basis for commencing the tariff reductions shall be [two] times the MFN
applied rate in the base year;
- the base year for MFN applied tariff rates shall be 2001 (applicable rates on
14 November);
- credit shall be given for autonomous liberalization by developing countries
provided that the tariff lines were bound on an MFN basis in the WTO since
the conclusion of the Uruguay Round;
- all non-ad valorem duties shall be converted to ad valorem equivalents on the
basis of a methodology to be determined and bound in ad valorem terms;
- negotiations hall commence on the basis of the HS96 or HS2002
nomenclature, with the results of the negotiations to be finalized in HS2002
nomenclature:
- the reference period for import data shall be 1999-2001.
6. We furthermore agree that, as an exception, participants with a binding coverage of
non-agricultural tariff lines of less than [35] % would be exempt from making tariff reductions
through the formula. Instead, we expect them to bind [100] 7o of non-agriculturaltariff l ines at
an average level that does not exceed the overall average of bound tariffs for all developing
countries after full implementation of current concessions.
7. We recognize that a sectorial tariff component, aiming at elimination or harmonization
is another key element to achieving the objectives of paragraph 16 of the Doha Ministerial
Declaration with regard to the reduction or elimination of tariffs, in particular on products of
export interest to developing countries. We recognize that participation by all participants will
be important to that effect. We therefore instruct the Negotiating Group to pursue its
discussions on such a component, with a view to defining product coverage, participation,
and adequate provisions of flexibility for developing-country participants.
8. We agree that developing-country participants hall have longer implementation
periods for tariff reductions. In addition, they shall be given the following flexibility:
a) applying less than formula cuts to up to [10] % of the tariff lines provided that the
cuts are no less than half the formula cuts and that these tariff lines do not exceed
[10] % of the totalvalue of a Member's imports;or
b) keeping, as an exception, tariff l ines unbound, or not applying formula cuts for up
to [5] % of tariff lines provided they do not exceed [5] % of the total value of a
Member's imports.
We furthermore agree that this flexibility could not be used to exclude entire HS Chapters.
9. We agree that least-developed country participants shall not be required to apply the
formula nor participate in the sectorial approach, however, as part of their contribution to this
round of negotiations, they are expected to substantially increase their levelof binding
commitments.
10. Furthermore, in recognition of the need to enhance the integration of least-developed
countries into the multilateral trading system and support the diversification of their production
and export base, we call upon developed-country participants and other participants who so
decide, to grant on an autonomous basis duty-free and quota-free market access for non-
agricultural products originating from least-developed countries by the year [...].
11. We recognize that newly acceded Members shall have recourse to special provisions
tor tarilt reductions in order to take into account their extensive market access commitments
undertaken as part of their accession and that staged tariff reductions are still being
implemented in many cases. We instruct the Negotiating Group to further elaborate on such
provisions.
12. We agree that pending agreement on core modalities for tariffs, the possibilities of
supplementary modalities such as zero-for-zero sector elimination, sectorial harmonization,
and request & offer, should be kept open.
13. In addition, we ask developed-country participants and other participants who so
decide to consider the elimination of low duties.
14. We recognize that NTBs are an integral and equally important part of these
negotiations and instruct participants to intensify their work on NTBs. ln particular, we
encourage all participants to make notifications on NTBs by 31 October 2004 and to proceed
with identification, examination, categorization, and ultimately negotiations on NTBs. We
take note that the modalities for addressing NTBs in these negotiations could include
requesUoffer, horizontal, or vertical approaches; and should fully take into account the
principle of special and differential treatment for developing and least-developed country
participants.
15. We recognize that appropriate studies and capacity building measures shall be an
integral part of the modalities to be agreed. We also recognize the work that has already
been undertaken in these areas and ask participants to continue to identify such issues to
improve participation in the negotiations.
16. We recognize the challenges that may be faced by non-reciprocal preference
beneficiary Members and those Members that are at present highly dependent on tariff
revenue as a result of these negotiations on non-agricultural products. We instruct the
Negotiating Group to take into consideration, in the course of its work, the particular needs
that may arise for the Members concerned.
17. We furthermore ncourage the Negotiating Group to work closely with the Committee
on Trade and Environment in Special Session with a view to addressing the issue of non-
agricultural environmental goods covered in paragraph 31 (iii) of the Doha Ministerial
Declaration.
Annex C
Recommendations of the Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services
(a) Members who have not yet submitted their initial offers must do so as soon as
possible.
A date for the submission of a round of revised offers should be established as soon
as feasible.
With a view to providing effective market access to all Members and in order to
ensure a substantive outcome, Members shall strive to ensure a high quality of
offers, particularly in sectors and modes of supply of export interest to developing
countries, with special attention to be given to least-developed countries.
Members shall aim to achieve progressively higher levels of liberalization with no
a priori exclusion of any service sector or mode of supply and shall give special
attention to sectors and modes of supply of export interest to developing countries.
Members note the interest of developing countries, as well as other Members, in
Mode 4.
Members must intensify their efforts to conclude the negotiations on rule-making
under GATS Articles Vl:4, X, Xlll and XV in accordance with their respective
mandates and deadlines.
Targeted technical assistance should be provided with a view to enabling developing
countries to participate effectively in the negotiations.
For the purpose of the Sixth Ministerial meeting, the Special Session of the Council
for Trade in Services shall review progress in these negotiations and provide a full
report to the Trade Negotiations Committee, including possible recommendations.
Annex D
(b)
(c)
Modalities for Negotiations on Trade Facilitation
1. Negotiations shall aim to clarify and improve relevant aspects of Articles V, Vlll and X
of the GATT 1994 with a view to further expediting the movement, release and clearance of
goods, including goods in transit.? Negotiations hall also aim at enhancing technical
assistance and support for capacity building in this area. The negotiations shall further aim at
provisions for effective cooperation between customs or any other appropriate authorities on
trade facilitation and customs compliance issues.
2. The results of the negotiations shall take fully into account the principle of special and
differential treatment for developing and least-developed countries. Members recognize that
this principle should extend beyond the granting of traditionaltransition periods for
implementing commitments. In particular, the extent and the timing of entering into
commitments hall be related to the implementation capacities of developing and least-
developed Members. lt is further agreed that those Members would not be obliged to
undertake investments in infrastructure projects beyond their means.
3. Least-developed country Members will only be required to undertake commitments to
the extent consistent with their individual development, financial and trade needs or their
administrative and institutional capabilities.
4. As an integral part of the negotiations, Mernbers shall seek to identify their trade
facilitation needs and priorities, particularly those of developing and least-developed
countries, and shall also address the concerns of developing and least-developed countries
related to cost implications of proposed measures.
5. lt is recognized that the provision of technical assistance and support for capacity
building is vital for developing and least-developed countries to enable them to fully
participate in and benefit trom the negotiations. Members, in particular developed countries,
therefore commit themselves to adequately ensure such support and assistance during the
negotiations.s
6. Support and assistance should also be provided to help developing and least-
developed countries implement he commitments resulting from the negotiations, in
accordance with their nature and scope. In this context, it is recognized that negotiations
could lead to certain commitments whose implementation would require support for
infrastructure development on the part of some Members. In these limited cases, developed-
country Members will make every effort to ensure support and assistance directly related to
the nature and scope of the commitments in order to allow implementation. lt is understood,
however, that in cases where required support and assistance for such infrastructure is not
forthcoming, and where a developing or least-developed Member continues to lack the
necessary capacity, implementation will not be required. While every effort will be made to
ensure the necessary support and assistance, it is understood that the commitments by
developed countries to provide such support are not open-ended.
7. Members agree to review the effectiveness of the support and assistance provided
and its ability to support the implementation of the results of the negotiations.
e lt is understood that this is without prejudice to the possible format of the linal result of the
negotiations and would allow consideration of various forms of outcomes.
s In connection with this paragraph, Members note that paragraph 38 of the Doha Ministerial
Declaration addresses relevant technical assistance and capacity building concerns of
Members.
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8. In order to make technical assistance and capacity building more effective and
operational and to ensure better coherence, Members shall invite relevant international
organizations, including the lMF, OECD, UNCTAD, WCO and the World Bank to undertake a
collaborative effort in this regard.
9. Due account shall be taken of the relevant work of the WCO and other relevant
international organizations in this area.
10. Paragraphs 45-51 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration shall apply to these
negotiations. At its first meeting after the July session of the General Council, the Trade
Negotiations Committee shall establish a Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation and appoint
its Chair. The first meeting of the Negotiating Group shall agree on a work plan and schedule
of meetings.
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